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During a Tactical Air Campaign, the commanders (decision
makers) on each side are faced with many decisions which
affect the outcome of the campaign. They make decisions
such as how many sorties should be flown in offensive,
defensive or support roles, specific targets to be hit,
mission profiles, and the mix of aircraft to be sent against
each target.
Two of the most important and basic decisions in a
Tactical Air Ware are: a) the apportionment of sorties
among the various air tasks and b) the allocation of
aircraft to be sent against each target.
A Tactical Air Operation involves the employment of
tactical air power to gain and maintain air superiority,
inhibit movement of enemy forces, seek out and destroy
enemy forces and their supporting installations
(and) directly assist ground or naval forces to achieve
their immediate operational objectives... [Ref. l:p.l-l]
The mission of tactical air power is:
"To deter the enemy from attacking, and should deterence
fail, to conduct war at the level of intensity and
effectiveness needed to win." [Ref. l:p.l].
This mission demands the right forces effectively employed.
When faced with an enemy offensive air threat, a priority
mission of tactical air forces is to defeat the enemy air
effort. At the same time, encaged surface forces must be
12

provided close air support at a level commensurate with
the pace of their operation and the pressure exerted by
enemy ground forces. The relative weight and timing of the
effort committed to these tasks will vary according to the
nature of the threat and degree of success achieved by
friendly air and surface forces.
The above formidable task of apportioning sorties among
offensive defensive, or support roles and of allocating
aircraft within the different air roles (air base attack,
close air support, tactical maritime operations) in a
multi-strike campaign requires reliable, demanding training
and realistic exercises. [Ref. l:p.l-2]. The latter have
to stress the tactics that will be used in combat and can
be achieved by simulation using a computer war game.
[Ref. 2:p.l6]. The decision process employed by a commander
can be characterized as a two-sided war game in which the
successive decisions which are made each day are based upon
the resources available and the status of enemy forces.
[Ref. 3: p. 4]
.
Many detailed simulation models have been developed to
study the employment of tactical air forces and to practice
different force mixes, but these models are constructed to
represented a large scale of operations and attempt to
approach an exact model of the real life situation. The
problem with many of these models is their enormous size.
13

The data bases are huge, and the computer storage space
required to run these models severely limits where they
can be operated.
For example the IDA TACWAR model (a comprehensive
theater level model developed for the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
requires 10,000 data items to be input for model operation.
[Ref. 4].
B. PROBLEM SETTING
Consequently, there is a need for a small scale model
which allows a student analyst of tactical air operations to
create his own battles and to test his own strategies with
a program which is simple to use and inexpensive to run on
a computer.
Such an Air Combat Model Simulation would deal with the
apportionment and allocation decisions and will be used as
a preparation step for student analysts to participate in
one of the more complex war models used in the level of
Tactical Air Force, General Staff, or National Defense
General Staff (DOD)
,
[Ref. 5] . The level of detail in the
model would be such that participants could readily observe
the impact of their allocation decisions, note where they
have made mistakes, and formulate new strategies.
14

C. OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
The objectives of this thesis are twofold:
1. To find a progressive overview of fundamental
principles met in Air Combat Modeling Simulation.
2. To determine an informal, two-sided air combat
model in which the participants make decisions and
supply input data.
D. OVERVIEW
The thesis is structured such that the reader can
progressively develop background. In Chapter II the
conceptual setting of the nature of the System's Modeling
is presented along with its types and their processes.
Furthermore some distinct concepts of system simulation
are presented. Chapter III deals with Modeling in Theater
Level of Operations, the associated problems and the main
elements of consideration. Chapter IV focuses directly on
the Air Combat Model Simulation and the elements of
constructing similar models.
Finally, Chapter V demonstrates an air combat model
simulation namely "ICARUS" which is presented in the
analytic phase-demonstration to give a basic picture of
an air model construction process.
Throughout the thesis, it is assumed that the reader is
generally familiar with computer programming techniques
and is very willing to support this basic study with





Trying to understand or predict the behavior of a very
large and complex organization like an Air Force, one real-
izes that there are a lot of variables and combinations of
them which make it impossible. Keeping track of all the
interactions while being able to make decisions based on
the interactions of such a complex system is outside the
capabilities of the human mind.
Consequently, there is a need for a way to study similar
problems and today the answer is System Simulation. In
other words by following a scientific process and using the
digital computer, one can make predictions and make
decisions
.
The above paragraphs express efforts of many decades,
if not centuries, of the research and scientific community.
Therefore, a stepwise detailed analysis of the included





The ways of expressing the acieved effectiveness of a
complex system with applications oriented to the Air Force
will be presented as a conclusion to this section.
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1 . What is a System
Gordon in [Ref. 16:p.l] defines a system as:
"An aggregation or assemblage of objects, in some regular
interaction or interdependence."
For the purpose of this thesis a more specific and opera-
tional definition will be used, given by Fitzgerald
[Ref. 6]
.
"A system can be defined as a network to interrelated
procedures that are joined together to perform an
activity or to accomplish a specific objective. It is
in effect, all the ingredients which make up the whole."
The above definition is broad enough to include
"static systems," but the principal interest of this thesis
will be in "dynamic systems," where interactions cause
changes over time.
Mil-std 499 (USAF) defines also the system as it is
considered in the combat modeling environment as:
"A system is a composite of equipment, skills, and tech-
niques capable of performing and/or supporting an
operational role. A complete system includes all equip-
ment, related facilities, material, software, services,
and personnel required for its operation and support to
the degree that it can be considered a self-sufficient









Figure 2.1 Aircraft Under AUTOPILOT Control
17

For an example of a conceptually simple system,
consider an aircraft flying under the control of an auto-
pilot, Figure 2.1. A gyroscope in the autopilot detects
the difference between the actual heading and the desired
heading. It sends a signal to move the control surfaces.
In response to control surface movement, the airframe
steers toward the desired heading.

























Figure 2.2 A Factory System
and assembles parts into a product, see figure 2.2. Two
major components of the system are the fabrication depart-
ment making the parts and the assembly department producing
the products. A purchasing department dispatches receives
18

finished products. A production control department receives
orders and assigns work to the other department.
In looking at these systems, one sees that there are
certain distinct objects, each of which possesses properties
of interest. There are also certain interactions occuring
in the system that cause changes in the system.
2 . Terms of a System
Entity : is an object of interest in a system
[Ref. 16:p.2] or an entity is each of the elements of the
system.
Attribute : is a property of an entity. Consequently,
each entity has one or more attributes
.
Activity : is any process that causes changes in
the system.
State of the System : is a description of all the
entities, attributes and activities as they exist at one
point in time.
The progress of the system is studied by following
the changes in the state of the system.
In the description of the aircraft system, the enti-
ties of the system are the airframe, the control surfaces,
and the gyroscope. Their attributes are such factors as
speed, control surface angle, and the gyroscope setting.
The activities are the driving of the control surfaces and
the response of the airframe to the control surface
19

movements. In the factory system, the entities are the
departments, orders, parts, and products. The activities
are the manufacturing processes of the department. Attrib-
utes are such factors as the quantities for each order,
type or part, or number of machines in a department.
Every system has three basic features. It has an
environment in which it exists. It has a set of boundaries
which distinguish the system from the result of its environ-
ment. And it has a set of subsystems which are its component
parts . [Ref . 15]
.
A system is consequently often affected by changes
in the system's environment occuring outside the system.
Some system activities may also produce changes that do not
react on the system. An important step in modeling systems
is to decide upon the boundary between the system and its
environment.
"Endogenous" is a term used to describe activities
occuring within the system and the term "exogenous" is used
to describe activities in the environment that affect the
system.
A system for which there is no exogenous activity is
said to be a "closed" system in contrast to an open system
which does have exogenous activities [Ref. 16:p.4].
Another distinction that needs to be drawn between
activities depends upon the manner in which they can be
described. Where the outcome of an activity can be described
20

completely in terms of its input, the activity is said to be
"deterministic". In other words the output of a determin-
istic system can be predicted completely if the input and
the initial state of the system are known. That is, for a
particular state of the system, a given input always leads
to the same output . On the contrary, where the effects of
the activity vary randomly over various possible outcomes,
the activity is said to be "stochastic". [Ref. 16:p.4].
That is, a stochastic system in a given state may respond
to a given input with anyone among a range or distribution
of outputs . For a stochastic system-given the input and
the state of the system- it is possible to predict only
the range within which the output will fall and the frequency
with which various particular outputs will be obtained over
many repetitions of the observation. It is impossible to
predict the particular output of a single observation of
the system. [Ref. 19:p.l4].
A very basic distinction in a system's classifica-
tion is the way a system changes from one state to another.
The previous examples, aircraft/factory, respond to environ-
mental changes in different ways. The movement of the
aircraft occurs smoothly, whereas the changes in the factory
occur discontinously , i.e. the ordering of raw materials or




Systems such as the aircraft, in which the changes
are predominantly smooth, are called "continous systems".
Systems like the factory, in which changes are predominantly
discontinous , will be called "discrete systems". Because
the distinction of continous vs discret is a very important
step with serious consequences on how the system will be
represented, the author will insist on some more supporting
classifications of the issue continous vs discrete.
In the same examples, the complete aircraft system
might even be regarded as a discrete system. If the purpose
of studying the aircraft were to follow its progress along
its scheduled route, with a view to study air traffic prob-
lems, there would be no point in following precisely "how"
the aircraft turns. It would be sufficiently accurate to
treat changes of heading at scheduled turning points (check
points) as being made instantaneously, and so regard the
system as being descrete.
In addition, in the factory system, if the number of
parts is sufficiently large, there may be no point in
treating the number as a discrete variable. Instead, the
number of parts might be represented by a continuous vari-
able with the machining activity controlling the rate at
which parts flow from one state to another. The later
approach is called Systems Dynamics. [Ref. 13:p.5].
This ambiguity in how a system might be represented
illustrates an important point. The description of a system,
22

rather than the nature of the system itself, determines what
type of model will be used. A distinction needs to be made
because the general programming methods used to simulate
continuous or discrete systems differ.
3 . Why we Analyze a System
The objectives in studying system behavior are "to
learn how the state transitions occur, to predict tran-
sitions in state, and to control state transitions".
[Ref . 19:p.l6] .
In general, the objective of a system study is to
predict how a system will perform before it is built.
Clearly, it is not feasible to experiment with a system
while it is in this hypothetical form. An alternate that is
sometimes used is to construct a number of prototypes and
test them, but this can be very expensive and time-consuming
Even with an existing system, it is likely to be impossible
or impractical to experiment with the actual system. For
example, it is not feasible to test the results of a
thermonuclear bomb or to ditch an airplane in order to
predict its behavior in water landings.
Consequently, system studies are generally conducted
with a "model" (substitute-simplification) of the system.
B . MODELS
Up to this point the reader has been oriented in the
area of investigation (the system) and the basic terminology
23

As mentioned previously, the initial step in analyzing a
system is to build a "model" of the system.
In this section the notion of "model" and "modeling"
will be implicitly and explicitly presented since they
constitute the basic framework and purpose for this study,
i.e. to study the modeling of Air Operations.
1 . The Nature of Modeling
The process by which the analyst arrives at a model
of the phenomanon he is studying is probably best described
as "intuitive". If one grants the modeling is an intuitive
process for the analyst then the interesting question is how
to develop this intuition. [Ref. 8:p.B-707]. What can be
done for the inexperienced person who wishes to progress as
quickly as he can toward a high level of intuitive effec-
tiveness? Can one answer only, "Get more experience, for it
is the chief source of intuitive development?"
Military organizations have been the source of much
of the development of modern, sophisticated modeling techni-
ques, but the concept of models and modeling is neither new
nor specific to military applications
.
The Greeks had highly abstract models of the nature
of the universe, e.g. the earth-fire-water-air and the
atomic models of the substance of things; the Euclidian
geometry, the axioms of which were generally accepted as
consistent with the real world; and the Ptolemaic geometric
model of the universe. Every artistic, scientific or
24

commercial endeavor is based on an implicit if not explicit
model, including an objective, the means to be used, and
the environment within which it will be carried out.
Each theoretical or scientific study of a situation
centers around a "model," that is, something that mimics
relevant features of the situation being studied. For
example, a road map, a geological map, and a plant collec-
tion are all models that mimic different aspects of a
portion of the earth's surface.
The concept of a model is then very broad and
general, and alway subject to constraints.
Hartman in [Ref. 24] defined a model as "a represen-
tation of some aspects of a subject of interest," which is
potentially useful to analysts and decision makers because
it represents the real world but does not replicate it.
The latter probably confuses the reader but one has to keep
in mind that the effort is to simplify particular aspects
of the real world to help us solve particular problems . It
is not the intent to represent everything in an all purpose
model that tells everyone everything, solve nothing, and
takes forever doing so.
"Forever" may sound overstated, but any length of
time longer than that which is available, because of the
nature of orders from superios, is effectively forever.
Thus, to the first constraint of limiting the scope
of the models to be considered on military (primarily Air
25

Force) applications one must add a constraint on the
complexity and length of time required for solutions and
"computer runs." However, reducing complexity always
involves a trade off with realism and the risk of omitting
a factor that is important. This is particularly likely
for factors that are not quantifiable or not readily
quantifiable.
The art of modeling is becoming increasingly sophis-
ticated in methods for introducing nonquantif iable
,
judge-
mental factors. One such method is the introduction of
a "man-in-the-loop, " a man-computer interaction. Never-
theless, the analyst must be enternally vigilant against
overemphasis on the numbers and must always seek to define
the limits and omissions of the model as well as what they
do to assist the analysis. He must make the limits and
omissions of his analysis clear to the decision-maker he
seeks to aid. [Ref. 9:p.I-5].
For the purpose of this theses the following defini-
tion of the "model" will be utilized. [Ref. 24]
.
"A model is the process of developing an internal
representation and set of rules which can be used
to predict the behavior and relationship between the
set of entities composing the system when a realistic
range of inputs is provided."
2 . The Purpose of Modeling
If models are not all-purpose and cannot do every-
thing, what can they do? Models can attack many specific
26

kind of problems but one must note that models cannot always
solve problems, particularly in the military field in which
answers can only be determined in real war.
Although the models cannot always provide solutions,
they may "shed light" in several ways: [Ref. 9:p.I-63].
Constructing and using a model increases the under-
standing, by both the analyst and his "client," of the
problem being studied. The purpose is not just to educate
the modeler. The learning must be transfered to the user
or decision-maker.
Models can also aid in making choices . They can
assist in comparing alternative weapons systems, tactics,
environments, routings, training methods, and so on. They
may sometimes give answers, in the sense that the absolute
numbers are taken as valid. For example, a limited
logistics model may be able to give valid estimates of
absolute quantities of fuel consumed, or vehicles in given
circumstances. On the other hand a bomber penetration model
may give 70 percent bomber survival, or 70 percent of
targets hit. However, one cannot know that 70 percent would
be the real number unless it was in real combat.
One should always seek first to learn from a model
.
[Ref. 9:p.73]. In the process of learning one can often
use a model to assist in making choices while caution and
skepticism are always in order. One should seldom, if ever,
27

accept absolute results of applying models, at least in the
highly uncertain world of military affairs.
The purpose of a model should always be subsidiary
to the purpose of the modeler or the decision-maker he
serves. Analysts analyze, and the models can assist them in
their taks . Models should always come after the definition
of the problem. Modeling is one, but not the sole aid to
analysis. It is never clear that a numerical mathematical
or computer model should be used, or that a particular
type of model should be used.
The above may sound obvious, however it frequently
occurs that analysts apply a model they know and like, but
this may not be the best approach to the problem. [Ref. 9:
p. 3] .
3 . Types of Models
Models can be classified in a variety of ways and
can take many forms. Taylor stresses the following three
basic types of models: [Ref. 10:p.4],
a. Iconic Models
An iconic model is a large or small-scale repre-
sentation of states-objects, or events. For example a scale
model airplance resembles the system under the study. They
"look-like" what they are supposed to represent with only a
transformation of scale. More examples of inconic models
are a flow chart, road map (or any picture or diagram that
28

looks like the real thing), or a wind tunnel. In each
case only the scale of the system or operation has been
changed.
b. Analog Models
In this model a property of the real system is
represented by a "substituted property" which often behaves
in a similar way. For example, an electric circuit that
behaves like a mechanical system is an analog model.
c. Symbolic Models
This model uses a symbol rather than a physical
device to represent an entity of the system. Verbal
description of processes or systems qualify also as
symbolic models.
When symbols represent quantities the model is
usually called a Mathematical model , for example a set of
equations. Later the focus will be on mathematical models of
combat, in particular, combat attrition and therefore an
indepth analysis of the mathematical model will follow.
Hartman gives the definition of mathematical
model as follows: [Ref. 24].
"A mathematical model is an abstract, simplified, mathe-
matical construct related to a part of reality and
created for a particular purpose."
As far as a model is concerned, the world can
be divided into three parts:
1. Things whose effects are neglected.
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2. Things that effect the model but whose behavior the
model is not designed to study.
3. Things the model is designed to study the behavior of.
The model completely ignores item (a) . The
constants, functions, and so on, that appear in item (b)
are external and are referred to as "exogenous variables"
(also called parameters, input, or independent variables).
The things the model seeks to explain are "endogenous
variables" (also called output or dependent variables).
The exogenous-endogenous terminology is
frequently used in economic modeling. The input-output
terminology is used in areas of modeling where the model is
viewed as a box (computer) into which one feeds information
and from which obtains information. The parameter-
independent-dependent terminology is the standard mathe-
matical usage.
Definitions of the variables and their inerrela-
tions constitute the "assumptions" of the model. Cne then
uses the model to "draw conclusions" i.e. to make predictions
This is a deductive process: If the assumptions are true
the conclusions must be also true, [Ref. 24].
4 . Thoughts on Mathematical Modeling
When one tries to construct a mathematical model one
may face a variety of conditions which can cause the
abandonment of the effort as hopeless.
30

The mathematics involved may be so complex that
there is little hope for analyzing or solving the model.
This complexity can occur when using a system or partial
differential equations or the problem may be so large
(factors involved) that it is impossible to capture all the
necessary information into a single mathematical model. A
military confrontation (combat model) is an example. In
such cases one attempts to replicate the behavior directly
in some manner by partitioning from the collection of
these data and then reach conclusions.
On the other hand one may attepmt to replicate the
behavior "indirectly" by using, (mainly) , the digital
computer.
Mathematical models can be distinguished according
to their characteristics into four classification schemes
as follows:
a. Analytical vs Numerical
In an analytical model it is possible to deduce
the behavior of the system, directly from the system's mathe-
matical representation. Kirchoff's law (electricity) is an
example of an analytical model. A numerical model implies
that an exact deduction of the system's behavior is not
feasible but numerical methods can provide descriptions of
the behavior for certain system aspects as are defined in
the numerical model. Numerical integration is an example
of a numerical model.
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b. Continuous vs Discrete
Continuous-change models are used to represent systems
that consist of a continuous flow of information or material
(e.g. Flow of gas in a pipeline). Continuous models are
usually represented by differential equations which describe
"rate of chage of the variables over time." Discrete-
change models represent systems in which "changes in the
state of the system are discrete" (e.g. messages arriving
at a node of a network) . Discrete models are usually
represented using queueing theory and stochastic processes.
c. Static vs Dynamic
A static model either does not take into consideration
the passage of time or describes the states of a system
at a specific point in time. On the other hand, a dynamic
model explicitly recognizes the passage of time. A dynamic
model may specify also the relationships between the various
system states at different points in time.
d. Deterministic vs Stochastic
In a deterministic system's model, all the entities
of the system modeled have fixed mathematical or logical
relationships to each other and the behavior of the
system is completely determined by these relationships
.
Hence, its output is uniquely determined by its input in the
sense that the same input always produces the same output .
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*A Stochastic model contains an element of chance
(called also uncertainty) so that its output is not uniquely
determined by input, but rather one must talk about the
chances of observing various outputs for a given input. In
other words, one must consider the Probability Distribution
over the set of possible outcomes for a given set of inputs .
5 . The Modeling Process
In previous sections the notion of model and
modeling was presented as well as their common distinctions
according to characterists
.
Now a closer examination of the process of mathe-
matical modeling will be demonstrated. [Ref. ll:p.ch-2]
Suppose one wants to understand some behavior or
phenomenon in the real world, or may wish to make predic-
tions about the behavior in the future and analyze the
effects various situations have on that behavior.
One procedure which can be followed is to conduct
some real world trails or experiments and observe their
effect on the real world behavior. This is depicted in
the left side of Figure 2.3.
While this procedure might seem ideal, one would not
want to follow such a course of action. For instance, the
cost of conducting even a single experiment may be prohib-
itive, such as detonating a 50 kiloton nuclear weapon over











Figure 2.3 Reaching Conclusions about Real World Behavior
willing to accept even a single experimental failure, such
as investigating different designs for a heat shield for a
manned spacecraft.
The preceeding analysis underlines the need of
developing an indirect method for studying real world
phenomena.
Looking again at Figure 2.3 (right side) suggests an
alternative way of reaching conclusions about the real
world. First, make some specific observations about the
behavior being studied and identify the factors that seem to
be involved. Usually one cannot consider, or even identify,
all the factors involved in the behavior, so make simplifying
assumptions that eliminate some factors.
Next, conjecture tentative relationships amongst






The Methodology of Model Construction
Having developed the required background from the
previous sections attention is directed to the construction
of Mathematical models. The outline of the procedure will
be presented as is given by Weir and Giordano. [Ref. 11 :p.
C2-17] .
The various steps are:
STEP 1. Identify the problem ; What is it that you want
to do or find out? Typically this is a very difficult step
because people often have great difficulty in deciding
what must be done. In real life situations , no one is given
a simple mathematical problem to solve. Usually it is
sorted from large amounts of data to identify some particular
aspects of the situation for study.
STEP 2. Make assumptions : Generally you cannot hope
to capture into a mathematical model all of the factors
influencing the problem that has been identified. The task
is simplified by reducing the number of factors under
consideration. Then relationships between the remaining
variables must be determined.
a. Classification of the variables : What things influence
the behavior you identified in STEP 1? List things as
variables. The variables the model seeks to explain are
the dependent variables and there may be several of these.
The remaining variables are the independent variables .
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Each variable is classified as either dependent or indepen-
dent, or you may choose to neglect it altogether.
b. You may choose to neglect some of the independent
variables for either of two reasons :
1. First, the effect of the variable may be relatively
small compared to other factors involved in the
behavior.
2. You may also neglect a factor that affects the
various alternatives in about the same way, even
though it may have a very important influence on the
behavior under investigation.
c. Determination of the interrelationships among the
variables selected for study : Before you can hypothesize
a relationship between the variables, you generally must
make some additional simplifications. The problem may be
sufficiently complex so that you cannot see a relationship
among all the variables initially. In such cases it may
be possible to study submodels . That is, you study one or
more of the independent variables separately. Eventually
you will connect the submodels together.
STEP 3 . Solve or interpret the model : Now put together
all the submodels to see what the model is telling you.
In some cases the model may consist of mathematical
equations that must be solved in order to find out the
information you are seeking. Often a problem statement
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requires a best of optimal solution to the model, called
Optimization Models, (the study of optimization constitutes
a large and interesting field of Operations Research/Mathe-
matics in which extensive research is currently conducted)
.
Or you may end up with a model so unwieldy you cannot solve
or interpret it. In such situations you might return to
STEP 2 and make additional simplifications. Sometimes you
will even want to return to STEP 1 to redefine the problem.
STEP 4 . Verify the model : Before you use the model
you must test it out. There are several questions you
should ask before designing these tests and collecting
data, a process which can be expensive and time comsuming.
1. Does the model answer the problem you identified in
STEP 1, or did you stray from the key issue as you
constructed the model?
2. Is the model usable in a practical sense, that is,




Does the model make common sense?
Once the common sense tests are passed, you will want
to test many models using actual data obtained from
empirical observations. You need to be careful to design
the test in such a way as to include observations over the
"same range" of values of the various "independent
variables" you expect to encounter when usually using the
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model. The assumptions you made in STEP 2 may be reasonable
over a restricted range of the independent variables, but
very poor outside of those values.
Be very careful about the conclusions you draw from
any tests. Just as you cannot prove a theorem simply by
demonstrating many cases in which the theorem does hold,
likewise, you cannot extrapolate broad generalizations from
the particular evidence you gather about your model.
STEP 5. Implement the model : Of course your model is
no use just sitting in a filing cabinet. You will want to
explain your model in terms that the decisions makers and
users can understand if it is ever to be of use to anyone.
Further, unless the model is placed in a "user friendly"
mode it will quickly fall into disuse. Expensive computer
programs sometime suffer such a demise. Often the inclu-
sion of an additional step to facilitate the collection and
input of the data necessary to operate the model determine
its success or failure.
STEP 6. Maintain the model : Remember that your model
is derived from the specific problem you identified in
STEP 1 and form the assumptions you made in STEP 2. Has
the original problem changed in anyway, or have some
previously neglected factors become important? Does one
of the submodels need to be adjusted?
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Figure 2.4 The Iterative Nature of Model Construction
Figure 2.4 amplifies the above ideas in viewing the
modeling process, and attempts to display graphically its
iterative nature. One begins by examining some system and
identifying the particular behavior to be predicted or
explained. Next identify the variables and simplify the
assumptions/ and then generate a model. Finally, attempt
to validate the model with appropriate tests. If the
results of the tests are satisfactory the model can be used
for its intended purpose.
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The process depicted in Figure 2.4 not only empha-
sizes the iterative nature of model construction, but also
introduces the tradeoffs between model simplication and
model refinement. Start with a rather simple model, progress
through the modeling process, and then refine the model as
the results of your validation procedures dictate. If one
cannot come up with a model treat some variables as con-
stants, by neglecting or aggregating some variables, by
assuming simple relationships (such as linearity) in any
submodels, or restricting further the problem under inves-
tigation. On the other hand, if the results are not
precise enough, then refine the model. Refinement of a
model is generally achieved in the opposite way: Introduce
additional variables, or assume more sophisticated
relationships among the variables, or expand the scope
of the problem. By trading-off between simplification and
refinement you can determine the generality, realism, and
precision of your model. This trade-off process cannot be
overemphasized and constitutes the "art of modeling."
C. SYSTEM SIMULATION
By this point of the thesis the reader has achieved an
intuitive picture of the main notions; (system, model).
Now a modern and powereful method of solving complicated
problems will be presented. This is the use of digital
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computers to simulate a system or model, and subsequently
to make predictions of its behavior which is called
Simulation.
1. What is Simulation
Simulation is one of the most powerful techniques
available for solving problems. It is a very important and
useful tool for analyzing the design and operation of
complex processes or "systems". It involves the construction
of a replica or "model" of the problem on which one experi-
ments and tests alternative course of action. This gives
greater insight into the problem and a better position from
which to seek a solution. [Ref. 12:p.3].
Simulation is not new as an aid in solving problems.
Engineers have always used mechanical models of ships,
aircraft, and space vehicles to simulate full-scall proto-
types under actual operating conditions in test tanks and
wind tunnels. However the use of simulation as a decision
making tool for Management is relatively new. [Ref. 13:
p. 35] .
By using a digital computer, management can simulate
the behavior of entire business and manufacturing systems in
order to evaluate overall performance under the influence of
interacting factors. Simulation as a management tool
consists of representing the real world in terms of a
mathematical model that will react similarly to the situa-
tion after which it is patterned . A simulation model can
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be very general or quite specific, depending on its
intended use. [Ref. 13:p.35].
Among the many definitions offered by various
authors, the most suitable one for the purpose of this
thesis is the following given by Shannon. [Ref. 14]
.
"Simulation is the process of designing a model of a
real system and conducting experiments with this model
for the purpose either of understand the behavior of
the system or of evaluating various strategies (within
the limits impose by a criterion or set of criteria)
for the operation of the system.
"
The simulation problem solving approach, can be
conducted by experiments in a systematic way until either
finding a satisfactory answer or terminating due to lack of
progress. Starting from the point of present understanding
of the problem, proceed according to ability and applica-
tion to search for the best possible solution in the time
available. This means that simulation can be very laborious
and expensive and does not necessarily produce an acceptable
answer, much less the optimum answer. Later a critique of
the simulation approach will be illuminated.
Simulation forces one to observe and understand the
behavior of the problem by identifying those factors which
are important. This results in an appreciation of the
dynamics of the total system under study.
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2 . Simulation Process



























Figure 2.5 Steps in Developing a Simulation Model
steps depicted in Figure 2.5. [Ref. 13:p.38]. The author
will not insist on the analytic clarification of all the
notions and definitions presented in the flow chart, because
many of the included terms coincide with the model's devel-
opment and process of modeling which have already been
presented in preceeding parts of this section.
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However, some "technical" topics in simulation will
be presented as necessary background.
3 . Selecting a Simulation Language
Many special-purpose simulation languages have been
developed, and all that have remained in use do provide an
effective programming method for certain types of simulation
problems. A list of 23 such languages will be found in
[Ref. 15 :p. 276-278] see also [Ref. 16:p.3]. In choosing a
computer language for simulation programs, familiarity
should be one of the determining factors.
Each language also is based upon a set of concepts
used for describing the system. The term "world-view" has
come to be used to describe this aspect of simulation
programs. [Ref. 16:p.l94]. Payne comments in [Ref. 17:
p. 193] that learning a new programming language is not an
easy task. It requires a careful study of the language,
manuals and considerable practive in writing programs. It
is not only programming convenience that justifies such an
effort, often the major benefits result from learning the
language's new simulation concepts and techniques contained
in it as well as the ability to read programs written in the
language.
Although there are many possible languages available,




In the United States, FORTRAN is the most commonly
used general purpose programming language. It also is one
of the most commonly used languages for computer simulation.
[Ref . 18:p.l66]
.
However, FORTRAN is cumbersome to use in simulations.
This language requires a large number of statements in
programming. The net result is that the program becomes
very complex for any simulation. [Ref. 13:p.39].
2. GPSS
General Purpose Simulation System (GPSS) , was developed
originally be G. Gordon at IBM and is one of the most
popular discrete-event simulation languages. [Ref. 14 :p.
197] . GPSS is "process" oriented, containing" a supply of
flow chart-like blocks. It also provides a large variety
of autonomously generated measurements about the simulation
model. Each block type represents a specific action that
can occur in the system. The user constructs a logical
model of the system using block diagram consisting of
specific block types in which each block type represents
some basic system action. This visual representation
permits other peple to understand the structure of the
model with a minimum effort.
GPSS elements are blocks, transactions, and equipment.
Specific block types have a name, a characteristic symbol,
and a block number. Each block has designated a block
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time that indicates the number of time units required for
the action represented by the block. The block time is
not constant, it may vary in a random or nonrandom manner.
Transactions are basic units that move through the system.
Equipment elements contain facilities and stores. Facilities
can handle one transaction at time, whereas stores can handle
many transactions simultaneously. [Ref. 19:p.66]
.
3. SIMSCRIPT
SIMSCRIPT was developed by H. Markowitz, G. Hanser
and H. Karr at the RAND Corporation in early 1960s. [Ref.
17:p.l34]. It is a very widely used language for simulating
discrete systems. i.e. is based upon the notion that every
model system is composed of elements with numerical values
that are subject to periodic change. The state of a
system is described in terms of entities, attributes, and
sets. The status of a system is changed at discrete points
in simulated time by the occurence of an event.
The occurence of these events is governed by a
SIMSCRIPT provided timing routine. This timing routine
automatically keeps track of simulated time and causes the
various events to occur as they are scheduled by the simula-
tion program. The different kinds of events are enumerated
in an events list and a separate event subroutine has to be
written for each event. A person with limited SIMSCRIPT
experience can follow the words of a statement and usually
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comprehend the item. Compared to FORTRAN when the later is
used to represent a specific real world activity, it may
Prodi sat To ffnd Tt«n In Inventory trfifcn has th«
grmtost stock.
SIMSCRIPT





00 10 I - 2.N
IF (MAX-NSTOCK(I))
20,10.10
20 MAX - NSTOOE(l)
10 CONTINUE
Figure 2.6 Comparison of Statements FORTRAN vs SIMSCRIPT
require 10 to 20 statements. SIMSCRIPT can do the same job
with only two or four statements. See Figure 2.6 [Ref. 13:
p. 40]
.
4 . Verification and Validation
In the development of a simulation model, two of the
most important stages the builder must accomplish are
verification and validation. Without them the model formu-
lation, preparation, and translation into an acceptable
computer language are meaningless. This part of the thesis
will present an introduction to the issues of verification
and validation. Differentiation between verification and
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validation is difficult since they are not independent
processes
.
"Verification" is generally viewed as insuring that
the model behaves the way it was designed .
"Validation" consists of testing the agreement
between the behavior of the model and the real system .
[Ref . 14:p.30] .
An important distinction between verification and
validation is that models can be completely verified, while
complete validation is impossible. Van Horn [Ref. 20:pp.
247-257] suggests that a model may be considered valid
when it has achieved an "acceptable level of confidence."
Only the model builder and user can determine what is an
acceptable level of confidence.
There are four views concerning the problem of model
verification and validation: Rationalism, empiricism,
pragmatism, and utilitarianism [Ref. 14:p.213]. Each of
these philosophies will be discussed briefly,
a. Rationalism
Rationalism is closely associated with mathematics
and logic. Rationalism contends that a model is simply a
system of logical deductions derived from a set of unques-
tionable truths. Immanual Kant used the term "synthetic
a priory" to describe these premises of unquestionable
truth, [Ref. 21:p .B92-B101] . (see also [Ref. 13:p.l43]).
Kant and his followers argued that if one accepts the
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basic premises about a model (which tey considered unques-
tionable) and the formal logic used to deduce the consequences,
then one accepts the validity of the model. The problem of
verification has then been reduced to the problem of
stating the basic assumptions underlying the behavior of
the system being modeled.
b. Empiricism
In direct contrast to rationalism, empiricism refuses
to accept any assumption that cannot be verified by experi-
ment or analysis of statistical data. [Ref. 14:p.214].
Empiricists insist that model verification must begin with
facts not assumptions. Hence, they regard empirical
science, and not the mathematics, as the ideal form of
knowledge. "A sentence the truth of which cannot be deter-
mined from possible observation is meaningless" [Ref. 22:
p. 256]. Empiricists often emply formal statistical "tests
of hypothesis", based on historical data, to validate a
model. Rationalists argue that historical data often does
not show that a hypothesis can be accepted, only whether or
not it can be rejected. Aless extreme point of view is
held by the third group, the pragmatists.
c. Pragmatism
While both the rationalist and the empiricist are
primarily concerned with the internal structure of the
model, they disagree over the nature of the internal rela-
tionships that are valid. The pragmatist feels that the
49

validity of a model depends upon its ability to properly
transform inputs into outputs. If the model fulfills the
purpose for which it was built, then it is a valid model.
Proposing that the usefulness of the model be the key to its
validation, pragmatists emphasize the question of whether




Perhaps the most practical approach to model verifica-
tion and validation is taken by the utilitarian. Two
Important characteristics of this approach are:
The objective is to validate a specific set of
insights not necessarily the mechanism that generated the
insights
.
There is no such thing as "the" appropriate validation
procedure. Validation is problem dependent. [Ref. 20:
p. 248] .
Hence, this approach advocates the use of any of the verifi-
cation and validation tests which might apply to the model
being treated.
5 . Critique of the Simulation Approach
The previous material of this chapter has presented
different notions and techniques with one purpose: To study
the behavior of a complex system or its substitute, "the
model.
"
At the end of this chapter some more critique will
be directed toward the simulation technique with the
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objective of making the reader aware of the capabilities
and limitations of this problem solving method and of
pointing out the nature of some basic ideas concerning
simulation.
What problems should be solved with simulation
technique, and what conditions are necessary to achieve
successful results? These questions as to the proper use
of simulation do not have will-defined answers. There have
been many discussions of the appropriate use of simulation,
but these opinions have changed over a period of time and
are the subject of considerable controversy.
Payne in [Ref. 17:p.270] refers to use of the
computer by the latest generation for the following
motivations:
Primarily to achieve economy. The computer has
been used to do what had previously been done by people,
but faster, more accurately, and cheaper.
Secondly to do jobs which would not be feasible
without computers. The computer characteristics that make
it possible to do these operations are speed, accuracy, and
reliability.
Thirdly to gain "computing for insight" , which




The latest category includes the notion of simula-
tions. The goal is to increase understanding of the system
and to be able to predict how the system will behave in the
future and under altered conditions, and consequently to
make decisions as a result of the predicted behavior as one
of the inputs in the decision process.
However, and in spite of the above "good will"
intentions of the scientists, there is quite a large criti-
cism of simulation. The reader interested in modeling and
simulation is suggested and encouraged to search the exten-
sive and varied literature available in the subject. Also
in two periodicals mainly devoted to the subject of simula-
tion "Simulation" published by the Society for Computer
Simulation and "Simuletter" published by the Special
Interest Group in Simulation of the Association for
Computing Machinery, one can find computer-related articles
and commends from professional practitioners in the field.
D. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION TECHNIQUE
Systems-Models that exibit stochastic elements in their
behavior can be simulated with the aid of the technique
called "Monte Carlo" (named after the famout gambling resort
town of Monaco) . This technique involves sampling from
those known probability distributions that represent each




The element of chance (stochastic) is simulated by
generating so called "pseudorandom numbers" used to deter-
mine the outcomes of random events, such as the outcome of
firing at a target or the determination of the result in
an air combat engagement.
By completing a system/model simulation run many times
while keeping the nonstochastic inputs constant but allowing
the chance elements to fluctuate according to their known
probability distributions, a statistical average for run
results can be determined.
Turban and Merendith, see [Ref. 23:p.31] have listed
the steps necessary in building a Monte Carlo simulation as
follows
:
1. Describe the system/model and obtain the probability
distributions of the relevant probabilistic elements
of the system.
2. Define the appropriate measure (s) of performance.
3. Construct cumulative probability distributions for
each of the stochastic elements.
4. Assign representative numbers in correspondence with
the cumulative probability distributions
.
5. Generate a random number for each of the independent
stochastic elements and . . . (determine) the measure
of system performance.




Thus, the distinguishing feature of the Monte Carlo
method is the repetitive execution of an established experi-
ment or simulation involving randomness.
Most combat simulations (our main interest) in Defense
Planning are Monte-Carlo simulations.
The strong point of Monte Carlo simulations is that they
may contain a lot of details and therefore may be more
credible than a more abstract model. The large amount of
details, however, causes a significant amount of computer
time to be required for a single run.
Taylor in ref [Ref. 10:p.l8] specifies a number of
serious shortcomings to the use of Monte-Carlo simulation
for Defense Analysis.
First such simulations are quite costly to build. It
is not unreasonable to expect to spend 5 to 10 man-years of
effort to develop a detailed simulation of Tactical combat.
Second, they are costly to run, with typically 10-20
minutes of computer time required per replication for
equivalent battle time, and one needs 10-60 replications for
statistical stability in the results.
Additionally, because of the amount of details involved
the Data Base requirements are quite demanding. For example,
it is not unheard of to have several analyst spend about
three months preparing a new set of input data.
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It is also costly to maintain a staff of highly trained
personnel to insure that the computer program stays running
and free of errors (debugged) as changes are continously
implemented.
Finally the tremendous amount of detail (i.e. the large
number of variables and other parameters) present in a
simulation precludes the running of parametric studies to
examine the sensitivity of the model to changes in assump-
tions and input data.
TABLE I
Disadvantages of Monte-Carlo Simulation
1. Costly to build
2 . Costly to run
3. Costly to maintain
4. Lack of flexibility for change
5. Essentially impossible to perform sensitivity
and other parametric studies
The disadvantages of Monte-Carlo simulation are summa-
rized in Table I.
While electronic digital computers themselves are not
necessary for the execution of simulation, they do offer
tremendous speed and consistency of conditions for such
models. Thus the computer is ideally suited to perform the
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large number of repetitions required by the Monte Carlo
technique
.
E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOEs)
Within the Air Force and the rest of the DOD, the term
"Measures of Effectiveness" (MOEs) , is used in many
different ways. Whenever, the term is used, the MOEs are
seldom defined in such a way that the reader knows exactly
what is being measured. [Ref. 7:p.73]
.
There is difficulty in communicating between decision
levels since often there is no way for any decision maker to
find out what is meant by the terms used. The main reason
for having MOEs is to aid management in making decisions,
therefore this communication difficulty needs correction.
Confusion is further increased by having many MOEs for a
single specific mission. While these MOEs may at times be
somewhat similar it is seldom possible to go from one to
the other without more information. This information is
often lacking. [Ref. 7:p.73],
Hartman in [Ref. 24] defines MOE as:
"A MOE is a quantitative indicator of the ability of a
human/material, or material system to accomplish the
task for which it was designed. For a military force,




In general, a MOE is any index which indicates the
quality of a system. In the simplest case it may be a
measured physical quantity, such as range or payload. On
the other hand, it may be a calculated quantity based on a
measurement, such as mean down time between maintenance
actions. Lastly, it may be a predicted quantity based
on measurement and/or simulation. For example, "the
probability that a system can meet an operational demand
at a random point in the time while under attack," will
require prediction since there will be some uncertainty,
about the attack environment. [Ref. 25:p.8-9].
MOEs serve to indicate what can be expected from the
system, i.e. to measure the effectiveness of a system,
since the MOEs used will address system effectiveness at
the user level. At higher levels, other considerations
besides MOEs are used to make management decisions. These
considerations include, but not limited to, life cycle
cost, urgency of the need, priorities and politics. Thus
MOEs are one in a series of factors in the final decision
process
.
Before defining what will be meant by MOEs in the scope
of this thesis, several other terms must be defined. While
many of the definitions to be given are taken directly from
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MIL-STDS they are here to be sure that there is no
misunderstanding of what is being said.
AFM 11-1/ Volume I defines:
"Mission is the task, together with the purpose, which
clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason
therefore .
"
In other words, with identification of the prime mission
of the system and alternate or secondary missions one
answers the questions: What is the system to accomplish?
How will the system accomplish its objectives? Consequently
the mission may be defined though one or a set of scenarios.
Before a measure can be defined, the property being
measured must be defined. Therefore, before MOE can
defined, the meaning of "effectiveness" (a property) must
be agreed upon.
Mil-std 499 (USAF) defines Systems Effectiveness as
follows:
"System Effectiveness is a measure of the degree to
which a system achieves a set of specific mission
requirements. It is a function of availability, depend-
ability and capability. "
Now, three more terms must be defined, namely "avail-
ability," and "capability." Mil-std 499 (USAF) refers to
Mil-std 721B for these definitions. The later defines,
see also [Ref . 26] .
"Availability is a measure of the degree to which an
item is in the operable and commitable state at the
start of the mission, when the mission is called for




"Dependability is a measure of the item operating condi-
tion at one or more points during the mission, including
the effects of Reliability, Maintainability, and Surviv-
ability, given the items condition (s) at the start an
item will (a) enter or occupy any one of its required
operational modes during a specified mission, (b) perform
the functions associated with these operational modes."
and finally:
"Capability is a measure of the ability of an item to
achieve mission objectives given the conditions during
the mission.
"
The problem still exists of deciding on the scale (.units) to
be used for availability, dependability and capability.
Since Mil-std 721B states that dependability may be stated
as a probability, logically it is desirable to state the
other two as probabilities. [Ref. 25:p.77].
Hence:
Availability (A) : Is the probability that an item is in
operable and committable state at the start of a mission
when the mission is called for at an unkown (random) point
in time.
Dependability (_D) : Is the probability that an item will
Enter or occupy anyone of its required operational
modes during a specified mission.
Perform the functions associated with those operational
modes given the item Availability, and
Capability (C) : Is the probability that an item will
achieve the mission objectives given the Dependability.
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Thus D and C are conditional probabilities, also with
these definitions, A, D. and C are "statistically
independent.
"
With the above definitions, it follows that:
"A Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) of an item is a
parameter which evaluates the extent of the adequacy
of the item to accomplish an intended mission under
specific conditions. It is a function of Availability,
Dependability, and Capability." [Ref. 25:p.77].
Thus, MCEs are expressed as probabilities since A, D, and
C are probabilities.
1. Quantities for a Good MOE
USAF in [Ref. 7:p.77] suggests the following
quantities which have to satisfied by a "good" MOE:
a. The MOE should be sensitive to all variables affecting
the model.
b. The MOE should be precisely defined.
c. The MOE should not be overly broad.
d. The MOE's, as well as their input measures of perfor-
mance, should be mutually exclusive. This prevents one
aspect of the model from being counted several times and
weighting the MOE heavily for this aspect.
e. The MOE should be relevant to the mission. This
assures that the proper effectiveness is being measured.
f. The MOE should be express in terms meaningful to the




g. The MOE should have inputs that are measurable. If
the inputs are not measurable, the MOE cannot be evaluated.
h. The MOE and its inputs should be quantifiable if at
all possible. Qualitative evaluations should be used only
for aspects that cannot be measured. This is almost always
correct only in the man-machine interface.
2 . Assumptions and Ground Rules for MOEs
Following is a set of assumptions or ground rules,
which must be made for MOEs and with the presented
rationale. [Ref. 7:p.80]. No attempt has been made to
put them in any particular order of importance.
a. Standards MOE ' s will be at the user level. Since
these MOEs are inputs at all decision levels, it is only
here that it is possible to start standardizing. It would
be impossible to standardize MOEs at some other, higher
level, if the inputs to the user level were not standardized
b. There will be a separate MOE for each scenario for
which a system has a mission capacity. If the MOEs were
combined into some grand ensemble MOE, it would be impos-
sible to separate the MOE for the most important mission
from the least important one.
c. The mission for the system to be tested must be
defined before the measurement is made. For example,
the effectiveness of an aircraft will be different for an
air-to-air engagement than for an air-to-ground engagement.
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d. The scenario must be explicitly stated. The scenario
includes the following information:
1. The mission to be executed.
2. A completed definition of the system whose MOE is
to be determined.
3. For a test of one system against a second system
(i.e. a two-sided test) a complete definition of the
second side system including such things as "target
aspect angle" for radar systems.
4. The tactics to be used in the test.
5. The level of the engagement. For example, one-on-
one or N-on-M where N and M integers.
5. The use rate. For example, for an aircraft it
might be one sortie a day or a maximum sortie rate.
7. The sequence of events in the mission profile.
For an aircraft, this would be flight profile.
e. All quantifiable data elements and measures of
performance (A, D, and C) are to be stated and measured as
probabilities. Since the probabilities (data elements) are
either independent or conditional, their product has the
same meaning and value as obtaining by only determining
the value of measures of performance (A, D and C)
.
f. There will be a single, well defined, scale for
qualitative evaluations. Qualitative evaluations should
be used for man-machine interface only.
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g. The MOE, the measures of performance (A, D, and C)
,
and the data elements should always be reported.
3 . Demonstration of MOEs for Aircraft System
Since a system, by definition, is a self-sufficient
unit for a mission the term "Aircraft System" will include
cargo, bombs, missiles, pods, or whatever load the aircraft
is carrying. For this reason, Aircraft Systems are very
broad in their applications to missions as shown in
Table 3.6 which lists the Air Force missions and Aircraft
System missions. [Ref. 7:p.l20].
It can be seen that there is no one-to-one corre-
lation between the two. For example, using an Aircraft
System for air-to-air combat can be a part of counter air,
close support or combat air patrol (CAP) , Air Force mis-
sions. Therefore, the analyst-modeler in the scenario
should cover the Air Force mission be statements such as,
"an A-7E/AIM-7E Aircraft System, during CAP, engages a
MIG-19. . ."
There is a close time tie between Availability (A)
,
Dependability (D) , Capability (C) , and the sortie profile
for Aircraft Systems. For instance, Availability will
address all operations executed up to the time the engines
are to started. Dependability will cover all operations
executed from engine start to engine shut down including
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post flight aircrew and maintenance checks of the system.
After postflight checks, the Aircraft System is in the
Availability portion of the cycle again. Capability
addresses those periods of the sortie during which the
TABLE II
Air Force vs Aircraft Missions





3. Search and Rescue/Recovery
4. Airlift
5 Command and Control
6. Reconnaissance
7. Electronic Warfare
8. Airborne Atmospheric Sampling
9 Training




Air Force Missions Corresponding Aircraft Missions
1. Counter air 1, 2, 5, 7
2. Close Air Support 1, 2, 4, 12
3 Air Interdiction 2,6, 7
4. Fire Suppression 2, 7
5. Combat Air Patrol 1, 2, 3, 5, 7
6 Electronic Warfare 6 , 7
7. Reconnaissance 6
8. Search and Rescue/Recovery 3
9. Refueling 11
10. Forward Air Control 5, 6
11. Airlift 4
12. Battlefield Illumination 12
13 Command and Control 5
14. Training 9
15. Weather 6, 8
16. Research-Develop/Test-Eval 10
17. Demonstration Team 13
64
1, 2, 5
1, 2, 3, 4, 5
5, 8
2, 11
1, 5, 10, 13
3, 6, 7, 10, 15








aircraft missions shown in Table II are actually being
executed.
Following only the measures of performance (A, D,
and C) which make up the MOE ' s for an Aircraft System will
be shown in Figure 2.7, and the subsequent Figures. The
reader who is interested in the detailed process for any













Figure 2.7 Aircraft System MOEs
bomber, fighter, helicopter, transport or trainer and with
variations of armament loads will find in [Ref. 7 :p. 120-127]
a complete presentation of the MOEs selection and
estimation.
In Figure 2.7 the Aircraft System MOE are presented.
It is assumed that the analyst has been given, or has
stated, the scenario for the system. The scenario includes
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the system's mission. With this in mind the analyst can
proceed to those data elements that address the Aircraft
System's Availability (A), as in Figure 2.8.
The aircrew is considered equipped when they have
the proper required personnel equipment such as oxygen
masks, helmets, earphones, microphones, etc. The other
data elements are self explanatory.
Given the Aircraft System's availability, the
Aircraft System's dependability can be addressed. The
dependability data elements are taken during different
portions of the sortie as shown in Figure 2.9. These
portions (time-sequence) are broken into sortie phases
in the same manner as a usual Technical Order (T.O) check-
list for the aircrew.
Having already indicated the availability and
dependability of the Aircraft System, the only part of the
MOE left is capability. The data elements for A and D are
fairly mission independent for a given set of items that
make up the Aircraft System. Capability on the other hand,
addresses the Aircraft System's specific mission. As shown
previously in Table II, Aircraft Systems have certain
missions. A given Aircraft System will have a certain
capability for each of these missions. Figure 2.10 shows
how the capability of an Aircraft System is stated as that
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Figure 2.8 Aircraft System Availability
4 . System Attributes Other than Effectiveness
There are many system attributes other than system
effectiveness that are of interest to the operational
commanders. These other attributes of a system are not
measured directly. Only their effect on A, D, and/or C
will be measured by MOE's. The author will only name some
of them. The interested reader is encouraged for further

























Also other aspects of a system (e.g. doctrine,
organization, operational techniques, tactics, and training
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Figure 2.10 Capability of Aircraft Systems
by how these various aspects affect the System Effective-
ness. It is in no way a measure of these aspects when
they are varied and the effect on the MOE is noted. The
effect on the MOE is only one of the many important features
of these aspects. For example, one consideration in
deciding between two tactics should be the systems effective-
ness for each tactic. This can be determined by the MOE
using each tactic. Other aspects of the tactics must also
be examined. Some of these are the vulnerability of the
system using each tactic, the ease of using each, the
training required for each, the affect on interoperability
with other systems, etc.
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From the author's view it cannot be stressed too
highly that MOE s only measure effectiveness as defined
presently by the previous mentioned documents . Other
attributes of systems must also be evaluated by some other
means
.
5 . Some MOE Examples
The U.S. Navy in the manual for MOEs, [Ref. 28. p. 33]
presents some examples of operational selection of MOEs
which demonstrate the use of MOE.
CASE I
1. System evaluation of the air fire support capabili-
ties and limitation of the V/STOL A-8A aircraft in close
air support mission.
MOEs Selected
(a) Aircraft availability, which is defined as the ratio
of the number of aircraft available for the mission to the
number of aircraft for the mission.
(b) Timelines of aircraft's response, which is defined
as the ration of aircraft response to target "shelf fire."
(c) Ratio of weapon load carried by the aircraft to
the weapon load needed for mission.
(d) Ratio of aircraft ordnance delivery mode to
delivery capability needed.
(e) Average number of sorties per aircraft per day.
CASE II
1. Evaluation of aircraft ordnance carrying capability





(a) Percent of CAS attack, sorties for which an expected
target kill is achieved at or below a specified weapon
weight.
2. Determination of aircraft utilization.
MOE Selected
(a) Average utilization per aircraft per month.
3. Evaluation of aircraft performance in a rescue mission
MOE Selected
(a) Survival probability of seriously wounded personnel
in enemy territory as a function of the distance rescue
aircraft must fly.
CASE III
1. Evaluation of reconnaissance system performance in
identifying and locating targets.
MOEs Selected
(a) Average probability that the system or sensor is
capable of detecting targets of interest.
(b) . Average probability that the system or sensor is
capable of both detecting and correctly identifying targets
of interest.
(c) System or sensor's ability to localize targets once
the targets have been identified.
(d) System or sensor's time late, which is defined as the
time between detection by the system or sensor and the first
avaiability of this information for operational use.
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2. Evaluation of the contribution of reconnaissance
system performance to strike aircraft penetration of a SAM
barrier.
MOEs Selected
(a) Total attrition due to SAMs that is prevented by the
information provided by the reconnaissance sortie.
(b) Total attrition due to hostile interceptions that is
prevented by information provided by the reconnaissance
sortie
.
3. Evaluation of the value of reconnaissance information
for the interdiction mission in which strikes are made at
enemy truck traffic.
MGE Selected
(a) Expected number of trucks destroyed per convoy as a
function of reconnaissance system localization accuracy.
4
.
Evaluation of the influence and effect or reconnais-
sance system performance on sortie requirements
.
MOE Selected
(a) Number of reconnaissance sorties needed to support
an operational situation.
(b) Probability that the operationally useful information
about a particular target is on hand.
(c) Number (or percentage) of targets about which "live"
information of acceptable quality and quantity is in hand.
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(d) Number of reconnaissance sorties saved as a function
of the time delay between the gathering of and the using of
information from a reconnaissance sortie.
(e) Reduction in the strike effort (required to perform a
specific task) which is made possible by the use of informa-
tion gathered by reconnaissance.
(f) Number of strike sorties not wasted.
6 . Conclusions on Systems Performance
In general, there are two ways to observe or predict
the behavior of a system, [Ref. 29].
a. Control or record the external and internal variables
and observe actual System performance, however, it is often
not feasible because:
The cost of operating the system through enough trails
may be prohibitive.
The desired tests may be destructive in nature to the
system.
It may be desired to estimate the performance of the
system before it is built.
b. Construct a model of the System which captures the
essence of the system's performance rather than the actual
performance of the system itself.
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III. THEATER LEVEL COMBAT MODELS
In the preceeding chapters the reader was introduced to
the main elements, concepts and notions of System, Model and
Systems Simulation which apply to studying complex systems.
In this chapter the study will be focused on the military
applications of modeling and will try to answer questions
like:
Why an analyst is interested in combat models, Which are
the main elements of concern in a combat model, and How the
decision makers use combat models as aids to emply their
strategy.
Strategy: The art and science of employing the armed
forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national
policy by the application of force, or the threat of
force. [Ref. 30:p.l].
A. THEATER-LEVEL COMBAT MODELS AND UTILITY
Trying to trace and analyze the different interactions
between two (or more) opposing forces, in other words to
study the "combat processes", defines a combat model.
Hence, combat models are the tools or the means, and not
the end objective in themselves, to study or analyze some-
thing. The primary purpose is to gain an understanding of the




At this point lets make a brief review of the fundamen-
tals of combat. Figure 3.1 shows the basic concept of
combat. Simply stated, all combat involves the interaction
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I
COMSAT OPERATIONS OUTCOME
Figure 3.1 A Concept of Combat
forces are composed of men and equipment, are governed by
operating procedures, and involve some measure of combat
support. Both forces function in an operational environment
which is composed of natural factors such as weather and
terrain. The interaction between RED and BLUE results in a





a. Annihilation : The forces of one side are destroyed
virtually en toto on the battlefield by those of the other
side. Vanquished force remnants are routed, captured or
surrender to the enemy.
b. Territorial conquest : The seizure (capture and
occupation of all of one side's territorial objectives,
hostilities are terminated by the route, capture, or surrender
of opposing force.
c. Stalemate : The achievement of objectives and/or the
number of causalties suffered lead to a protracted conflict
or a negotiated settlement.
Now let us go back to the initial question: What are
typical Defense-Planning problems? Stockfish states them
as follows: [Ref. 31].
a. How to assess a possible opponent's military capability,
and how large should our military forces be to meet the
perceived threat?
b. How should the total force be structured between major
services, such as Land Forces and Tactical Air Forces?
c. How should the total forces be structured with
respect to (1) combat branches, such as infantry and tanks,
and (2) service specialties that provide logistic and
personnel support?
d. What should be the technical performance and
physical specifications of new weapons that will be the
object of engineering development programs? Given the
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availability of new weapons, what should be their tactical
usage, How many of them should be procured, and in what
organizational and command context should they be employed?
Such issues concern the evaluation of weapons-systems
and force-level planning alternatives in future time frames.
In order to determine the benefits from a particular alterna-
tive one must be able to predict the effectiveness of
specified military forces in possible future military engage-
ments. Since such forces and/or weapon systems only exist
"on paper," the combat models are used to study them.
Bonder states that in order to make predictions of
combat results one must carefully consider the following
characteristics: [Ref. 32. p. 75].
a. Weapons Systems Characteristics: Firing maneuver
capability, reliability, accuracy, lethality, acquisition
capability.
b. Organization Structure: The number of different
types of weapons systems in the organization.
c. Doctrine and Tactics: The behavioral decision
processes which drive much of the combat activities. On a
broad scale these include the choice of battle type Cattack.
a fixed defensive position, delay, chance meeting, with-
drawal, etc.) and the choice of defensive position. On a
more microscopic scale these include the weapon-to-target
fire allocation decisions, route selection, assault speeds,
and the decisions to initiate and end the firing activity.
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d. Terrain-environmental Effects: These include effects
such as the interaction of the line-of-sight process on
acquisition capabilities, agility of weapon platoforms , and
the effect of meteorological conditions on acquisition.
In summary the combat models are valuable in many aspects
of Defense Planning such as:
1. To design specifications and select new weapons.
2. To allocate recources between air and land and,
within land forces between infantry and artillery.
3. To allocate tactical air capability among diverse
missions
.
4. To specify the amount of logistic support that the
combat elements of field forces should have.
5. To estimate the rate at which forces might be
mobilized and deployed, and:
6. To decide how large the forces should be.
Before closing this section on combat models and their
utility, it is necessary to emphasize that there are
almost no empirically verified models of most combat
processes
.
The major difficulty is that the empirical data base
is too poor. (see [Ref. 10:p.8]) In other words, since
nations fight wars for other reasons than to collect combat
data, there is not a data base rich enough in detail to
permit the classic scientific verification of combat models.
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This shortage of historical and other empirical data for
combat models and analysis is apparently not as widely
acknowledged, articulated, or appreciated by the policy-
making community as it should be.
Karl von Clausewitz in the same spirit stated many years
ago in his classic work "on war" that:
"if theory caused a more critical study of war, then it
had achieved its purpose."
B. TYPES OF COMBAT MODELS
In the preceeding sections the evolution and notion of
combat models was presented. Now an indepth research will
follow on the types and structure of combat models and how
the human factor is involved in those combat processes
.
1 . Simulations
Simulation which runs completely without human
intervetion is perhaps the most widely used type of combat
model technique in military systems analysis, which runs
completely without human intervation. In order to obtain
predictions of outputs such as causalties, resources
expended, etc., in this type of combat model one arranges
the events and activities of the different combat processes
in a specific sequence. The decisions involved are based
on predetermined rules which are programmed into the automated
evaluation proceedure
.
Most simulations used in military planning contain
a significant number of stochastic events and activities
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in an attempt to capture the chance element (uncertainty)
associated with many combat processes. In such a stochastic




Analytic models are like simulations in the sense
that they also have no human involvement. As in the develop-
ment of simulations, the process is studied and decomposed
into its basic events and activities. A mathematical
description of all the basic events and activities is
developed, and these events and activity descriptions are
integrated into a mathematical structure of the process
.
3. War Games
Webster defines a Game as:
"A situation involving opposing interests given specific
information and allowed a choice of moves with the
object of maximizing their wins and minimizing their
losses.
"
The above definition most certainly applies, in
general, to warfare.
According to [Ref. 33:p.l85] and [Ref . 34] a War
Game is:
"A simulation, by whatever means of military operations
involving two ore more opposing forces, using rules,
data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or
assumed real life situation."
More specific for the thesis topic is the definition
given by Paxson [Ref. 35].
"A War Game is a model of military reality set up by a
judicious process of selection and aggregation, yielding
the results of the interactions of opponents with
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conflicting objectives as these results are developed
under more or less definite rules enforced by a control
or umpire group."
The distiguishing feature of war games in relation
to simulations and analytical models is that actual human
beings are used to simulate decision processes by having
people play the role of decision makers and use their own
judgment in making decisions.
Finally as a general comment one realizes that
"analytic models, machine simulations and games" are often
used to classify the analytic techniques in solving two-
sided military problems.
Models and simulations are techniques while games
are related to simulations and behavior ; the latter is a
viable mechanism to train decision makers.
Taylor in [Ref. 10:p.l2] classifies war games as
either "rigid" or "free", depending on whether or not the
assessment rules are rigidly prescribed and completely cover
all possibilities. The rigid war games are somewhat similar
to simulations in that combat interactions are considered
in detail. On the other hand, in "free" war games the




C. OBSERVATIONS ON MODELING
A morphological matrix can be postulated for all modeling
activities constructed around three basic dimensions TECHNIQUE,
SCOPE, and APPLICATION as shown in Figure 3.2.
These three dimensional cateogries are further expanded
as follows: [Ref. 36:p.7].
1. MODELING TECHNIQUE
a. Military exercises (Field, Fleet, Air, Joint)

















Figure 3.2 Modeling Classification Matrix
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c. Computer assisted manual war games
d. Interactive computer games




b. Major general engagement or battle (in-theater)
c. Local engagement "many-on-many units"
d. Local engagement "one-on-one/many units"
3. MODELING APPLICATION
a. Force planning
b. R/D planning, management, and evaluation
c. Operational planning and evaluation
d. Training and Education
The matrix shows that any modeling research performed in
models must be selective and focused on particular elements
of this matrix if the effort is not to become untenable in
its proportions. If one, for example, selects force plan-
ning as the APPLICATION topic to focus attention, then the
two other dimensions of the matrix indicate analytic/
computer games for the TECHNIQUE and theater level conflict
for SCOPE.
1. Combat Model Spectrum and Characteristic Trends
In the analysis of models it was stressed that
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Figure 3.3 Combat Model Trends and Characteristics
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2 . An Algorithmic Development of a Theater-Level Combat
Model
Following a basic guideline an algorithm will be
presented concerning the route of combat model development.
Starting with a need to model a large scale model the
following steps, each taking about a year, are necessary:
[Ref . 9:p.VI-17]
.
a. Develop overall architecture and design specifications
b. Develop or adapt algorithms for individual routines.
c. Research, adapt, or develop input data requirements.
d. Program and debug (correct) individual routines and
major sub-models.
e. Make first non-trial runs with user input and make
major modifications to control input and output.
f. Modify to incorporate user-directed changes in
weapons systems, doctrine, tactics, etc.
The above sequence reflects the general pattern
that has been observed in model development and a more
detailed discussion is necessary, according to the author's
view, for a better assimilation of the significance of the
steps
.
The overall architecture and design specifications
are usually in the form of flow charts to guide the
programmer. At this state, the architecture is guided by
relatively broad and simply stated objectives that, in prin-
ciple, meet all the sponsor's requirements, and at the same
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time, make the model fast and easy to operate. This is
usually interpreted to mean simple and quick changes in
inputs rather than computer running time. Often the sponsor
also specifies modularity, i.e., the ability to use more
than one set of routines, especially some that have already
been developed. This is easy to do at the flow chart level,
but is much more difficult to program.
The programming stage often produces several prob-
lems. First, the broad compass of theater-level models and
their cost usually result in a fairly large number of agen-
cies being represented at the progress meetings. The people
at these meetings discover for the first time that the mili-
tary functions for which they are responsible are not
represented in enough detail for the model to be of much use
to them. The original sponsoring agency and the developer
then face a dilemma. If the criticisms are ignored, they
lose the support of that angency. If they try to meet a
significant number of these criticisms, the model quickly
becomes difficult to control, and the input requirements
escalate in number and complexity.
The development and debugging of the master program
is a longer process that most developers recognize or are
willing to predict. Some theater-level models (IDA, TACWAR,
CEM, etc.) contain between 2Q00Q and 50QQ0 FORTRAN state-
ments. Early runs of a complex, debugged model often produce
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an overall pattern of warfare that everyone would consider
"unrealistic.
"
Most theater-level models require about three years
before they can be run for the record. During that period,
many changes will occur in programs, priorities, and know-
ledge about enemy forces and systems. It is almost certain
that a change in the model will be required very quickly to
deal with a new program. This begins a process that, in
practice, is unending. The result is a constant struggle to
keep the program and its documentation up to date. If, as
frequently happens, their is a significant personnel turnover
in the agency operating the model, the result can critically
affect the future of the model.
3 . Theoretical View of Aggregation
Now let turn the focus in the systematic process of
combat modeling to the topic of aggregation. If one cannot
model the individual combatants in detail then it is neces-
sary to use "Aggregation." The characteristics which will
be considered as appropriate to aggregate are:
a. Force Size: What level of unit it is required to
model? i.e. Theater, Tactical Air Force, Group, Combat
wing, Squadron, One to one
b. Functions Being Modelled: Mainly they concentrate
on Attrition, Maneuvers, Command and Control, Interbranche
(Air Force-Army-Navy) coordination, Logistics, Intelligence.
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c. Environmental Factors: At this level very extended
areas are modelled and the main problem is to represent
terrain and weather.
d. Decision Processes: Between individual weapons (who
is to shoot at whom). There are Manual Processes, Human/
Computer Interactions or Automated Decisions.
e. Randomness: Use "stochastic" processes up to Combat
Wing level and "deterministic" in some higher level of
modeling.
f. Intended Use of Model: Decide how the model will be
used. For example, for analysis or strategic/tactical
investigation or simulating Decisions Simulations.
Let us suppose one is trying to build a combat model
where E = (Combat Entities)
and S = Scenario Description, then the mapping
E x S Re (eqn 3.1)
gives the aggregation results Re. In that case f is a
"combat model" so as given E, and S it computes the combat
results Re, (e.g. number of aircrafts, target destroyed,
attritions, etc).
If one cannot represent the model f then must
aggregate. In that case the set (E) is aggregated into the
U x S 2 Ru (eqn 3.2)
38

much smaller set (u) of units (e.g. Battalion, Combat
Wing), then g is an "Aggregated Combat Model ."
An example of aggregation is the case when one has
several units representing Divisions and presents their
attrition as a percentage.
Division Strength = (1% causalties) *Division
Strength (End-Start of day)
.
Bode in [Ref. 36:p.61] explains aggregation as:
The "lumping together" of several individual things
into a composite thing which is then used to collectively
represent the individuals. Similarly aggregation can be
viewed as:
* A transition from individual (or micro) properties
to ensemble (or macro) properties (Natural sciences)
.
* Selective encoding of key information which
"summarizes" a group of individuals (Communications science)
* A many-to-one representation of individuals in the
system by individuals in a coarser and less complex system
(Systems science)
.
The key point is that, aggregation loses information
about the identities since it combines elements into units
and individual processes into rates of attrition.
4 . Validity and Theater-Level Combat Models
As has been shown, no theater-level models contain
all the elements of a theater war. It follows that the
"historical method of validating" a model is a shaky one at
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best, in the following sense: "We have calibrated many of
the existing models to the results of the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War and we can reproduce the results." [Ref. 9:p.VI-21].
There are two reasons why the historical method
should be used with caution.
First, the environment and force structure on the
two sides may not be typical of those the model is designed
to investigate. In practice, in case of similar modifica-
tions, the required changes would be so extensive that the
result would be a "new model."
Second, a major factor in past war may not be
explicitly incorporated in the model. One example is the
critical importance of electronic warfare in the 1973
Arab-Israeli War which many models did not consider.
There is a large literature on the validation of
models in general and theater level models in particular.
This thesis will present the issue of combat model valida-
tion along the lines of [Ref. 9:p.vi-22] is which four
types of validity are treated:
a. Input Validity : The accuracy, currency, consistency,
and authority of the force structure and the system perfor-
mance data base.
b. Design Validity : The degree to which the logical
structure of the model and its algorithms are internally




c. Output Validity : The degree to which the model's
output enables the user to rank alternative inputs in terms
of specified criteria. To have output validity, the model's
output must be sensitive to input variations that the user
intends to make.
d. Face Validity : The willingness of the decision-maker
to make decisions based (at least in part) on the model
because he believes that it makes sense.
5 . Conceptual Structure of Combat Models
There exist two principal ways to structure models
for analysis:
(a) Bottom-up. This way takes technical data of weapon
systems, physical constants and mathematical principles and
aggregates them through different levels of analysis to a
final result. This is the way how, for example, the outcome
of an engagement of an aircraft versus an antiaircraft
missile is modeled. Taking the time necessary to detect
and identify the aircraft as a threatening target and the
time to aim (lock on) and launch the missile, as well as
trajectory-directional data of the SAM, the probability of
hitting the target can be calculated. Taking a (pseudo-)
random number, the model can actually predict if the aircraft
is killed or not. Manual wargames and stochastic or
deterministic simulations are examples of this kind of
modeling [Ref. 37:p.l2]. The important aspect is that the
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model is connected to the reality through the use of
technical or physical data.
(b) Top-down. This approach is different in the way that
it uses mathematical representation of the effects of sets of
















Figure 3.4 Data-Driven vs Concept-Driven for Aggregation
attributes of each individual weapon. The outcomes of mili-
tary encounters can be determined by manipulating mathematical
expressions rather than simulating physical interactions.
The principal differences between data-driven and concept-
driven analysis is depicted in Figure 3.4.
92

After the tracing of several combat models an ideal
structure for the modeling of combat has been derived,
































Figure 3.5 Structural Concept of Combat
it is not satisfied entirely by anyone model.
In brief, Figure 3.5 consists of a dynamic combat
loop concerned with friendly force vs enemy counterforce
93

activity coupled to a command control loop though intelli-
gence, reconnaissance and surveillance means by which
friendly perceptions of combat activities are generated.
Logistics support is an important function (often negleted in
modeling) , since the system is also vulnarable to enemy attack
of supply lines.
A similar block can be constructed for the enemy
forces, around the "counter force activity" block presenting
the dynamic behavior of the system.
Theater models, if indeed they are to be reasonably
faithful abstractions, must address the "givens" in a problem.
They can be listed as shown in Table III [Ref. 38:p. 53-70].
In modeling warfare situations, one essentially feeds
the combat elements (as inputs) into mathematical formulations
of the combat processes that are tied together by appropiate
logic to derive outputs which are, in effect, the outcomes of
the encounter between the opposite forces.
Applying the concept of the elements, processes and
outcomes mentioned above one can structure the combat model
into a series of cause and effect loops that are, to a large
measure, interactive, see Figure 3.6 [Ref. 38:p.69.].
But whatever approaches are taken, they will be
constrained by data that are or cannot be made available.




b. Official military histories
c. Field/fleet/air exercises
d. Combat experiments
e. War games, models, and simulations
f. Operational test and evaluation (OT & E)
g. Proof tests
h. Engineering laboratory tests and design studies
As noted by Taylor in [Ref . 39] . (a) and (b) are
sources of real combat data while (c) , (d) and (f ) are
sources of simulated combat data. Data for the "technical"
characteristics and performance of military equipment are
represented in (g) and (h)
.
Reviewing the issues and problems associated with
model design development and application, an attempt has
been made to structure a graphical depiction of their
interrelationships
.
Modeling issues are organized into two major inter-
dependent groups. One group concerns MODEL and GAMING
STRUCTURES in the broad sense of model concept and design,
and the other concerns COMBAT OPERATIONS and PROCESS
MODELING.
At this point the forcus will be diverted to Figure
3.7 which shows factors that directly affect modeling.


















Combat circumstances, initial objectives and missions
(both sides)
Natural and man-made environments in the area of
operations
Human resources, numbers and characteristics
Material resources, numbers and characteristics
Organization and structure of opposing forces





Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C I)
Combat support
Combat service support
whole scheme of Figure 3.7 a run through route will be
followed.
At the top of the figure is an abbreviated represen-
tation of the spectrun of armed conflict as it is observed
to occur in the real world. One must recognize the need for
some form of analysis of the real world as the enabling
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Figure 3.6 Structural Elements, Processes, Outcomes
adjunct to planning. This analysis must be shaped and
constrained by existing or anticipated world conditions
(political, economic, military), national and military
objectives, budgetary considerations, etc. The analysis
can be qualitative or quantitative.
In pursuing the quantitative methodology, one enters
the realm of conflict abstraction. Following the route of
quantitative analysis, it is the activity of gaming that
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Figure 3.7 Theater-Level Modeling: Gaming Structures
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From the two fundamental forms of modeling, analytical
and simulation, shown in the figure, simulation will be fol-
lowed. As technique, simulation dominates virtually all
efforts to model combat, and around simulation technique two
fundamental modeling structures are built, namely hierachical
and global.
The hierarchical approach involved a "stepping-stone"
build-up of information from "one-on-one" models up to
"force-on-force" ones. The structure of global simulation,
by contrast, incorporates complete hierarchical states of
combat activities and operations in a single model. The
next issue is deterministic versus stochastic modeling, as
shown in the same Figure 3.7. Ideally the stochastic
modeling oc combat should be preferred, as natural choice.
However, the two major difficulties; a) absence of suitable
statistical data and b) the complexities associated with
combat have to be considered.
The modeling of strategy and tactics. This area
encompasses the human "behavior" in operational decision
making and weapons employment into models of combat. In
Figure 3.7 a dichotomy is implied in model structures by
the boxes labeled Fixed/Variable Strategies and Tactics.
With fixed strategy models, the attack and defense
objectives and plans, the weapons to be used, and the allo-
cations of manpower and weapons to specific roles are
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decided before and became a matter of input to the model.
"What if" questions can be answered by repeated runs with
the model and appropriate variations of the input. On the
other hand in treating variable strategies and tactics as a
part of game structure, three basic techniques have been
advanced:
* Contingency rules (table look-up)
* Game theory (analytic and computational)
* Man-machine interactive or player-assisted gaming
The above concludes the discussion based on Figure 3.7
which was restricted to factors that directly affect gaming
structure, its form, size, and complexity.
Next to be considered is the modeling of combat
operations and functions. This hierarchical view of rela-
tionships is reflected in Figure 3.8, in which the upper
part repeats some of the classification material of Figure
3.7, indicating that the structure of the model selected
(a simulation for example) should depend on the nature of
the required degree of resolution to be provided by the
model.
Tracing down the Figure 3.8, one deals with the
issues of modeling tactics, doctrine, and command and control
of Ground and Air warfare. The figure emphasizes the
importance of command, control, communications and intelli-
gence. The combat missions shown are the classical ones,
while air and ground activities are closely interrelated in
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actual combat, an attempt is made to dissociate the combat
missions into activities that are primarily ground (solid





Figure 3.8 Theater-Level Modeling: Combat Modeling
from the Figure 3.8, that these problems suggest a specific
issue and difficulty in theater level combat models.
D. DECISION MAKING AND COMBAT MODELS
The notion of decision making process as a function of
mental activities is a complicated one and specifically
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under the situation of uncertainty, stress, fear, threat and
time restrictions.
Trying to model these reactions in a combat model simula-
tion is one of the most difficult issues ever addressed in
the combat model community.
In this section the author will focus the study in the
fundamental process and role of judgment in the decision
theory perspectives and the latest available methods of
modeling decisions in air combat models.
1 . Decision Process a Judgmental Approach
The effectiveness of any military system is the
extend to which the system achieves a set of objectives. The
quantitative expresssion of the extent to which specific
missions requirements are attained by the system is referred
to as a measure of effectivenss CMOE)
.
In the Operations Research community, it is important
to distinguish between the performance (e.g. rounds fired
per minute, single shot kill probability, etc) of a weapon
system and its effectiveness or military worth. Failure to
choose appropriate MOEs can lead to completely wrong
conclusions as to preferred alternatives.
Although, as stated previously, performance data for
a weapon system may be collected in "Operational tests," a
combat model is usually required to "put it all together"
against an enemy threat in an operating environment to
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estimate systems effectiveness. In other words, the combat
model transforms performance measures into effectiveness
measures .
Now comes the main decision. What specific "measures
of effectiveness" or what specific "outcome measures" one
ought to use?
Some of the specific measures which are going to be
presented are "outcome measures," that are really concerned
with our judgements on which of a number of possible out-
comes for a simulation is preferred. Here is the main source
of difficulty for the decision maker in trying to select
satisfactory measures.
Following is a brief presentation of the various
kinds of measures within a decision theory perspective.
The first of the measures, namely outcome measures
are concerned with judgments about which of the possible
outcomes are preferred.
The second type of measure called decision criteria
are concerned with courses of action preferred among a
number of alternatives and:
The third type of measure, known as, measure of
effectiveness (MOE) concerns measures like which system or
which combination of systems is best.
Obviously, the fundamental purpose of the above
measures is to assist the overall decision process. In each
case, the measure serves essentially as "value criteria" in
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making decisions. Actually, most people are quite good in
using intuitive value judgments to make decisions. The
problem arises when one tries to deal with such "judgmental
values" within the comtext of a formal analysis, like in
proofs through combat model simulations.
In the above case the scientifc training suggests
that one should address the problem objectively and not by
resorting to subjective judgmental criteria. Consequently
there is a conflict between the intuitive way of approaching
the problem and the way one thinks he ought to try to
approach it from a schientific perspective.
Decision theory suggests to use values in common
sense reasoning and that is justified by some fundamental
principles of "cybernetic" efficiency. (Greek word "cyber-
netis" meaning the control of process of information
transfering with a system under the mathematical or computer
assisted method)
.
A better understanding will be acquired by learning
how to use those principles about "judgmental values" within
the combat model analysis and simulation process itself.
Today it is well understood that one can incorporate
some of the "subjective value" criteria in a model's
construction and in doing so can build models that are
considerably more flexible and more efficient. The only
reservation is that if one is going to include subjective
value criteria these value criteria must be explicit so the
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model user can understand the outcome within the context of
the value criteria that have been used.
Pugh states that the traditional benefits of "values"
within "value criteria" is that they make it possible to
decentralize the decision process and still get a reasonable
sensible result. [Ref. 40:p.72]. Consequently it is helpful
to make decisions in terms of intermediate outcomes when one
is unable to project the outcome of the decision all the
way to an ultimate outcome . Values also serve in a very
practical way as a tool of command.
One of the things that a commander does in giving
commands to his subordinates is to define value priorities
or priorities for his course of action . The commander's
action specifies the value priorities by which the subordi-
nates will make their decisions.
At this point a formal definition of value should be
helpful to the reader.
Pugh defines
"Value is a scalar quantity, associated with outcomes for
the purpose of making decisions." [Ref. 40 :p . 73]
.
To make decisions among a number of alternatives a "value
function" is needed.
"Value function is a scaler function defined over the
space of possible outcomes for the purpose of making
decisions. " [Ref. 40 :p. 73]
.
In other words a value function assigns values to the
various outcomes and makes choices between them.
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A typical form of a value is essentially a summation
over a number of considerations of a series of values that
are somehow functions of the outcome. It generally takes the
form of a weighted sum of the number of considerations, all
V = Sf i (u, u u_ . .
.
, u )1^3 n (eqn 3.3)
of which are relevant to the decision.
One of the lessons that comes out of looking at this
formally is "do not omit any important consideration from
the definition of value criteria."
The next point needed to be clarified is how the
values really are used within a decision process, given that
one is willing to program a decision system on a computer
process.
The simplest form would look like the following
shown in Figure 3.9.

















ALTERNATIVE CONT INUE SEARCH
Figure 3.9 The Human Decision Process
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An initial loop inputs data and fundamentally updates
the model of the information about the environment within
which decisions are to be made. The next step is to consider
a series of alternative, and for each alternative, to simulate
or project the outcome. Finally, value criteria are used to
assess the outcome. So, in order to be able to apply the
value criteria, a way to calculate the value of each of a
number of possible outcomes is needed.
In projecting, predicting outcomes the question which
arises is, what it is defined as an "outcome." If one tries
to think too far ahead, the process becomes very complex.
So almost all practical military decisions are made in
terms of outcomes that are projected for only a relatively
short time ahead.
On the other hand, people typically use "rule-of-
thumb criteria." They do not think ahead at all, but given
a particular state of the environment, they make some
specific decision. To make good decisions that way, a
complex network of decision rules is needed, or in our terms
a very complex value function. Most of the practical deci-
sions that are made every day are made by thinking a little
way ahead and using judgmental value criteria to evaluate
the projected outcomes.
But lets see now how the values are generated in a
military environment where the value decision process is
very complex. In Figure 3.10, starting with long-range
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national goals and objectives, the military objectives are
specified as a kind of subsystem. At the highest level of
military goals and objectives one probably comes to long-
range criteria. (i.e. the objective of winning the war).
But as soon as one moves from that to how he is going to
fight the war on an intermediate basis, then he wants a good
exchange ratio with the opponent. As one proceeds downward
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Figure 3.10 Hierarchy of Military Value Criteria
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has to do with short-range tactical objectives on particular
pieces of terrain, which have to do with exchange rations.
It is noticeable that as one moves down this chain
he is moving from value criteria that are useful in terms of
looking a long distance ahead to judgmental value criteria
that are useful in terms of short-range decisions.
Finally at the bottom of this chain one comes to
what is called "instantaneous measures of effectiveness."
These are the MOE s that tell what the "firepower score" is
for an aircraft or what the combat effectiveness of the
airplane is vs a frigate.
Value measures have to be deduced from experience in
military matters, at the short-range level, perhaps at the
mid-range level, and theoretically even at the top level.
E. VALUE-DRIVEN DECISION THEORY
The proper modeling of Command-Control and Intelligence,
as it affects combat performance, has been one of the most
difficult problems confronting the combat situation designer
The combat effectiveness assessment is critically depen-
dent on availability of timely and relevant information, but
the lack of procedures for quantifying the implications of
improved information flow has made it extremely difficult to
assess the combat performance of new weapon systems. For
example, improved information has no effect on the maneuver-
ability of a particular aircraft or the rate of fire of a
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particular gun, however, it can profoundly influence combat
outcomes by changing the choice of missions for the aircraft
or the aimpoints for the gun.
To represent the effect of information quality on combat
outcomes, it is necessary to model the way that combat deci-
sions are influenced by the availability of information.
Recent theoretical developments in the understand of
human decision processes, appear to offer the possibility
of realistically simulating command-and-control processes
.
The new approach that is used to model the effects of C2I is
described as an information-oriented and value driven simula-
tion. This type of combat model simulates not only the
physical interactions between combatants, but also the
effects of information that is used by combatants to make
decisions in response to a changing combat environment .
In [Ref. 41] the development and associated theory is
explicitly presented with its applications to Air Force
efforts to model pilot's decisional behavior, in models
like TAC COMMANDER, TAC FIGHT, and TAC BRAWLER.
1. The Value-Driven Approach
The Value-Driven decision approach to the modeling
of C3 in combat simulations comprises both a formal struc-
ture and a body of guidelines and techniques for use in
applying the approach to combat simulations."
The essential element of the value-driven approach
is the "decision element." The formal structure of the
decision element is shown in Figure 3.11.
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The decision elements includes the capability to
receive and interpret sensor and communication data to form
an internal mental model of the external world, to generate
possible courses of action and to project their consequences,
and to select and direct the implementation of a particular
course of action.
The decision element is composed of three structural
element and a series of activities that are controlled by or
used in the construction or processing of the elements.
[Ref. 41], and [Ref. 9 :p. v-7 ,v-8]
.
a. The executive control program : This master program
performs the supervisory and control functions for major
decision elements. It oversees the execution of each of the
major activities, including those concerned with the informa-
tion and updating of the mental model and the generation,
projection, evaluation and selection of courses of action.
b. The prior knowledge library ; To realistically and
satisfactorily perform the decision-making function in a
combat simulation model, a decision model must have access
to information not accessible exclusively via sensor and
communication links with other decision elements. This
information is contained in the prior-knowledge library.





























Figure 3.11 Logical Structure of the Decision Element
The first is simply the knowledge of the rules or
laws of action which permit the decision element to project
the consequences of pursuing a given course of action.
The second concerns the set of alternative courses
of action that are generated as candidates for implementation.
The third conerns the evaluation of the courses of
action for the purpose of the selection of an alternative
for implementation.
c. The mental model ; For a decision element to contemplate
possible courses of action, to project their outcomes and
to evaluate their utility requires a "mental picture" or a
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"mental model" of the current state of the external world.
This mental model then serves as the basis for all activities
of the decision element.
The series of information processing activities
engaged in by the decision entity can be divided into:







(b) Activities that use the mental model in the generation,
evaluation, and selection of courses of action like:
1. Generate and project alternative course of action
2. Associate values with alternative courses of action
3. Select alternatives
2 . Value-Driven Method vs Other Methods
In this section a perspective of the value-driven
decision approach is developed that allows comparison to
other methods of treating command and control in combat
simulation. Comparison of the method with the methods of
"artificial intelligence" will be suggested as an individual
study topic to the reader.
The most common procedure for treating command and
control in combat (Air and Ground) models is the "decision-
rule approach." A brief description and further comparison
to the "value-driven approach" is following.
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decision-rule" or the closely related decision
table apprc ch. provides the simplest method for representing
dynamic dec sion processes in combat simulations. In a
representat ve scenario, two opposing commanders must deter-
mine the pcrure, e.g. attack, hold, and delay, which their
respective orces should assume during the next time period.
The determi ation is made by comparing the ratio of some
measure of ne strength of each force, most commonly "fire-
power score . " with a set of prespecified thresholds which
serve as br<ak points for selecting postures for the forces
.
For example a three-to-one force ration might serve as the
breakpoint or the stronger force initiating an attack and
and eight-t -one ratio would cause the weaker force to adopt
a delay posure.
ignificant features of the "decision-rule"
approach in omparison with the "value-driven" method are:
[Ref . 41:p. I] .
ecisions are based solely on the current state
of the forc«D. No projections of the consequences of
adopting a articular course of action are made in the simula-
tion. More'ver, the courses of action that are considered,
such as the lttack, hold, and delay postures are "hardwired"
into the sorware. No capability is available for dynamical-
ly generatinr courses of actions.
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All decisions are made by comparing selected measures,
such as the "firepower scores," to predefined, generally
inputted threshold values
.
The decision-rule approach, thus, lacks the richness
of the value-driven approach in terms of not allowing for
the dynamic generation, projection, and evaluation of alterna-
tive courses of action.
Other features of the value-driven approach, such as
the dat interpretation and situation perception function
while formally permitted in the decision-rule structure are
generally not developed in the form or with the degree or
richness of the value-driven method.
Finally, the value driven command language for
representing the flow of information among decision elements
in the command-and-control system is not present in the
decision-rule approach.
Thus, in spite of its desirable simplicity, the
decision-rule approach does not possess the versatility that
is needed to adequately represent command and control in
most combat simulations.
The principal advantages of the value-driven method
are:
a. Realism of representation : Each decision entity
identified as playing a crucial role in the representation




b. Power of the approach : The dynamic generation of
alternatives in response to changing combat conditions gives
the approach the power to generate realistic courses of
action either to exploit a developing situation or to prepare
a suitable defense.
c Flexibility of the approach : The use of values also
permits the user to easily modify tactics for play in the
simulation without modification of the software. The user
need only vary the value weights associated with actions
consistent with the desired tactics. New tactics can be
introduced into the simulation through the addition of tactics
but without modifcation the basic software.
The principal disadvantage of the method is its
complexity, "more straight forward" decision-rule methods
would seem to offer a simpler approach for representing
command and control in combat simulations. However, the
difficulty in generating suitable courses of action based
solely on the current state of the simulation and the lack
of flexibility to dynamically generate and evaluate alterna-
tive courses of action usually makes the "practical" applica-
tion of the simpler method more difficult, [Ref. 41:p.50].
F. MODELING OF ATTRITION PROCESSES
As one considers the entire field of ground and air
combat modeling and traces its development, one realizes
that attrition (causalties inflicted by either side on the
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other) is regarded as the functional ne plus ultra for the
engaged forces
.
The focus of interest on attrition apparently stems from
a preoccupation with "wars of attrition" such as occured
during WW I and most of WW II. In conflicts of this type,
the forces of the opposing sides are in contact and engaged.
There is generally ressistance to the movement of forces in
either direction, therefore, a FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle
Area) , can be drawn, or "bomb lines" can be defined, showing
the line of area of contact between opposing forces
.
In the world of modeling, it is the attrition process,
expressed either implicitly or explicitly, that causes the
force ratio to change. It is the prevailing force ratios
that in many models cause the movement of the FEBA, thus
controlling the winner or loser of the conflict.
With the importance of attrition so established, the
routes of attrition modeling presented by Law in [Ref. 42:p.9]
and shown in Figure 3.12 will follow:
1. Aggregated Differential Equation Approach
Taylor in [Ref. 10] in his work presents a two
volume analysis of the so called LANCHESTER-type models and
the willing reader will find a detailed clarification of the
methods of predicting attrition rates, in particular, the
coefficients that portray these rates. [Ref. 43:p.24].
Let us consider a combat between two homogeneous
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Figure 3.12 Basic Approaches to Attrition Modeling
by a homogeneous Y force (antitank) assumes that the casualty-
rate of such a homogeneous force is equal to the product of
the single weapon system-type kill rate and the number of
enemy firers .
The above method of attrition coefficient estimation
systems from early work of Lanchester.
The quantities A and B are called Lanchester attri-
tion rate coefficients. The coefficient A denotes the rate










Figure 3.13 Combat Between Two Homogeneous Forces
dx
dt =
- Ay with X(o) = Xo,
*1 =
dt
- Bx with Y(o) = Yo (eqn 3.4)
The above equations are known in the literature, see
[Ref. 43:p.l2] as constant-coefficient Lanchester equations
for "Modern" warfare.
In the simplest case A and B are constants (equ. 3.4),
independent of the number of combatants and other changes
A = a and B = b (eqn 3.5)
in engagement condition. In this simple case it is easy to
analytically and very explicitly extract information about
the dynamics of combat from our constant-coefficient
dx
ar
= - ay with X(o) = Xo,
*X =
dt
- bx with Y(o) = Yo (eqn 3.6)
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Lanchester-type model and one readily deduces Lanchester's
b (Xo 2 - X 2 ) a (Yo 2 - Y 2 ) (eqn 3.7)
famous "SQUARE LAW, (equ. 3.7).
The dimensions of A are (number of X casualties)/
(time * number of Y firers) . Thus, A is indeed a rate and
has the dimension of reciprocal time.
The coefficients a, b assume the basic operational
assumption that both sides use "aimed" fire. That is each
combatant on one side aims and fires at a live combatant on
the other. All combatants on either side are within firing
range of each other.
In a similar way when a weapon system employs "area"
fire, that is fire delivered over a fixed area over time
rather than aimed fire against individual targets, the
corresponding Lanchester attrtion-rate coefficients depend
on the number of tragets and hence the combat is modeled by
(equ. 3.8) where the area-fire attrition rate coefficients A
A = A(t) and B = B(t) (eqn 3.8)
and B do depend on the force levels. Such a coefficient
depends both on the vulnerable area of the target and also




Assuming now that the single-weapon-system-type kill
rate, for example, A depends not only on time t but also on
the number of targets x (e.g. target detection depends on
the number of targets) , then one is led to the further
enriched fundamental Lanchester-type paradigm for homogeneous
force combat in which the attrition-rate coefficients are:
A = A(t,x) and B = B(t,x) (eqn 3.9)
When a weapon system employs "area" fire and enemy
targets defend a constant area, the corresponding Lanchester
attrition-rate coefficient depends on the number of targets
A(t,x) = ax and B (t,y) = bAy (eqn 3.10)
dx
-tt: = - aAxy w:"-th x (o) = xo,
SC « - b xy with y(o) = yo. (eqn 3.11)
and hence the combat is modeled by equation 3.11 where the
area-fire attrition rate coefficients aA and bA do not
depend on the force levels.
Again, for the case of constant coefficients aA and
bA analytical results are readily obtained, and one readily
bA (xo-x)
- aA (yo-y) (eqn 3.12)
deduces Lanchester' s famous "LINEAR LAW."
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An excellent overview of the developments in
Lanchester attrition is presented by Taylor in [Ref. 10] and
[Ref. 44] relating them to the broader aspects of combat
modeling and gaming.
As a closing comment, attrition coefficients for
Lanchester 's equations have been modified to incorporate new
parameters. Time-dependent variable attrition-rate coeffi-
cients depend on the rate of closure between the firing
combatants and their targets, thus bringing battle dynamics
into the attrition process. Finally, the Lanchester formula-
tions have been modified to accomodate the heterogeneous
force mixes that reflect the "combined arms" nature of
warfare.
2 . Process Modeling and Simulation
The second approach to attrition modeling Figure 3.12
is embedded in modeling the broader combat process of "shoot,
move and communicate." This type of modeling began in "one-
on-one" and "one-on-several" weapon system duels, employing
either analytical or simulation technique.
In the development of this approach the firer-target
pairings are treated more or less discretely. The engage-
ments are modeled stochastically round by round, explicitly
considering the functional steps, which start with target
acquisition and end with the delivery of munitions and the
assessment of weapons effects. Along with this enrichment of
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attrition modeling, afforded by Monte-Carlo simulation, came
the opportunity to model many other important combat functions
and variables such as weapons and sensor mixes, movement,
terrain, communications, doctrine and intelligence.
The concept of a measure of effectiveness for each
of the systems in the friendly force emerges from the combined
interaction of these systems with the enemy forces in the
battlefield environment. The MOEs for these systems combine
in some manner to produce an overall MOE for the friendly
forces. This measure encompasses the effects of weapon
system combat performance relative to that of specific
enemy units in a specific geographical and climatical environ-
ment, the behavior of the human beings involved, the dif-
ferences in command objectives, the differences in the nature
and degree of control for both sides, and the ability of the
logistics-support system (which may well be subject to enemy
attrition) to meet the force demands. The force effective-
ness, in effect, operates on the states of both the enemy
and friendly forces, influencing whatever changes in state
(time, space, composition, and configuration) that may
occur. From these changes in state, one can determine
whether the friendly force advances, retreats, or is in a
stand-off condition with respect to the enemy force.
Before shifting to the last approach it is necessary
to discuss simulation of the Air War. As the scope of combat
activities treated by simulation broadened, the importance
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of putting air support into modeling became increasingly
apparent. This resulted ultimately, in air-to-air, air-to-
ground, and ground-to-air combat modules.
The initial pattern was somewhat different when
viewing the combined-arms modeling problem from the Tactical
Air Force side. Here, there appeared an early appreciation
for the fact that tactical air war was a supporting arm and
that its effectiveness could only be properly measured by
its influence on ground activities.
An important spin-off of the program of model develop-
ment by the Air Force was the early recognition of the
problem of air resource allocation in those instance in
which aircraft were used multifunctionally . In that case
the problem is to allocate multipurpose aircraft optimally
among the various missions. To this end the use of game
theory and the multistage game (two-person, zero-sum) was
introduced.
3 . Firepower Scores and Indices
A third approach to attrition modeling is the fire-
power scores method. Much as been written about firepower
scored and indices and there are many variations of the
concept. For the purpose of this thesis a brief description
will suffice. It can generally be stated that there are
three fundamental approaches to the problem of developing
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Indices of the relative value of weapons, based on
weapon firepower, have been employed by military modelers
and force-planners for many years. These indices, referred
as firepower scores (FPS) are also known as firepower
potential (FPP) . When summed to form the score for a unit,
they are called indices of combat effectiveness (ICE), unit
firepower potential (UFP) , etc. Indices of the "firepower"
category are essentially expressions on single round
lethality multiplied by an expected expenditure of ammuni-
tion (EEA) during a fixed period of time. Depending on how
the lethalities and EEA are calculated, FPS can be said to
represent a more general kind of effectiveness than just
firepower.
Firepower scores are frequently criticized as represen-
ting only firepower, and not, for example, mobility, target
acquisition, capability, and vulnerability.
b. Weapon Effectiveness Indices
The term weapon effectiveness indices or WEI are
used to reflect the firepower potential of a nonhomogeneous
combat force. The force has at its disposal a wide variety
of weapon types. To compute the firepower index, one simply
finds the products of firepower scores and adds these products
over all weapons types employed by the force.
This simple mathematical operation does indeed produce
some sort of indication, which reflects the capability or
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potential of a force to inflict causalties on an enemy. The
formula and weights for different weapon and characteristics
can be found in STAG'S report on Selected Analysis Task I,
June 1971.
The WEI consider many more weapon characteristics than
the FPP ' s , but unlike the FPP ' s they do not explictly consider
relative opportunity for engagement, nor relative amounts of
ammunition available.
c. Army War College Combat Power Scores
In 1970 the Army War College developed factors for
estimating the outcome of brigade level engagements. These
values represented the relative value of US and USSR armor,
infantry, and artillery units in seven different postures.
However, they can be aggregated into a signle set of scores
by averaging them over an appropriate distribution of
postures. [Ref. 45:p. 16-19].
d. Quantified Judgment Method (QJM)
The basic approach in this method is to define a set
of " potential " capability scores for weapons, namely
Theoretical Weapons Lethality Indices (TLI) and Operational
Lethality Indices (OLD / then develop a number of weapons
and forces modifiers which will bring predicted outcomes
into reasonable agreement with the observed outcomes of a
large number of historical battles.
Body in [Ref. 46 :p. 34-35] follows another approach
trying to quantify aggregated capabilities and express them
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in suitable form. Such aggregates are referred as Military
Effectiveness Indices (MEI) and following is a brief discussion
of them.
"Static" or potential MEI assess starting conditions
only, and relate to what could happen, not what does happen
in the real world of a model.
On the other hand a "dynamic" MEI is employed in
models such that the number of participants, locations, and
perhaps effectiveness, are changing over time. That means
that a "game" can be played.
Some applications of "static" and "dynamic" indices
will be presented.
STATIC
a. Inventory count : The indices are simple sums of
numbers of items
.
b. Index of Combat Effectiveness and Firepower Potential :
A number that suports to indicate the worth of a
combat unit in comparison to some standard unit. In the
ATLAS model, for example, the ICE are derived from FPS by
knowing the lethal area of a type of round of ammunition and
multiplying by an assumed daily expenditure rate for this
type of ammunition resulting in a Firepower Potential Score.
c. Based Aircraft Attriting Potentials : The potential
of an air force to destroy an opposing air force's aircraft
that are on the ground. It is the potential fraction of the
opposition's aircraft on the ground that are destroyed beyond
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repair (K-Kill) in one day when one air force, unopposed by
air defense, strikes the opposition's air fields. It is
measured in aircraft killed per day by the total number
of the oppositions aircraft in theater. The detailed calcula-
tions of the index are classified. [Ref. 46:p.39].
DYNAMIC
a. Global Level Models ; Global applications of the above
notions are conceptualized through, for example, specification
of the strategy alternatives in terms of military force size,
composition, and world-wide deployment, and political-economics
instruments of power such as treaties and trade agreements.
The payoff (MEI) must be specific in terms of global national
objectives
.
b. Theater Level and Battle Level Models : The trade-off
variables of interest are total force size, composition of
the forces, and deployment and employment of the force
composition including the mix If land, sea, and air forces,
and components of these factors such as units of armor,
infantry, air superiority fighters, ground attack aircraft,
etc. The analysis evaluates the capability of each opponent
to achieve selected objectives under varying (dynamic)
assumptions relative to the trade-off variables . A NATO-
Warsaw Pact military capability consideration is in the
above area of discussion.
Can a static MEI approximate the results of a
detailed dynamic model? The answer is perhaps, but none has
129

been generally demonstrated with sufficient credibility to
justify the index as a sole comparison. On the other hand,
static ME I can be useful adjuncts to the dynamic model.
Can a static index serve as a "rule of thumb"?
The answer is that no single index to date can be trusted as
the sole indicator, [Ref. 46:p.55] but a comparison of
several indices can help the analyst and decision-maker
develop insight.
At the present time judgement and experience remain
by far the most important tools for estimating the relative
effectiveness of military forces and the expected attritions.
Cordesman in [Ref. 47:p.201] states:
"Reality tells us that number and quality of
personnel dominate the outcome of war. MOEs tells us that
time differences in technology dominate computerized sand
boxes .
"
Most high-level decision makers have beeter intuitive




IV. AIR COMBAT MODELS SIMULATION
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the state of
the art of air battle models in such a way as to indicate
what should be built into, or expected to be available from,
a particular air combat model.
However, before starting a detailed discussion of air
combat models it will be useful to discuss the ways in which
air combat differs from surface combat and, hence, ways in
which air combat models can differ from surface combat
models
.
A. UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR COMBAT MODELS
Surface combat (LAND-SEA) takes place in an environment
that is much less homogeneous than is the air environment.
For example consider a campaign of moving ground forces
located at point "A" to combat point "B". This process could
depend on factors such as
:
1. The transportation means assigned or available to the
moving unit.
2. The intervening terrain.
3. The condition of the road net connecting point "A"
and point "B"
.
4. The season of the year.
5. The climate and or weather.
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6. The distance between point "A" and point "B"
.
7. The amount and type of traffic recently using the
road net.
Although some of the factors may have some influence on
operating air forces located at point "A" to combat at point
"B" , in general air forces are much less dependent on this
kind of environmental information. One way to characterize
this difference is to say that the air as a medium is much
less variable and, hence, much more homogeneous.
Another way in which ground battle models are more
complex is in the number of elements to be considered. A
conventional war in NATO involves only several thousand
aircraft and SAMs on each side. For the sake of comparison,
the number of crew served ground weapons that would be
employed in a ground war in Europe could easily approach one
hundred thousand weapons on each side.
A third way in which land combat is more complex than
air combat is the degree of inter-engagement dependence. The
status of a ground unit at the start of a given engagement
is very dependent on the nature and outcome of its previous
engagement. The number and type of surviving personnel,
weapons, and supplies were determined in the previous
engagement. The opportunity to reconstitute these resources
depends on the outcome of the previous engagement. Although
the posture of a combat unit is a function of the orders it
receives from the higher headquarters, the range of possible
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orders is largely determined by the outcome of the previous
engagement. Finally, the terrain on which a unit is
currently engaged is determined principally by the location,
the nature and the outcome of the unit's previous
engagement
.
Although some of these factors from a previous engage-
ment may influence the way in which a subsequent air
engagement takes place, in general, the air combat process
is much less dependent on this kind of prior engagement
information.
Another difference in an air battle is the nature of the
way in which weapons are employed. Ground forces tend to
fight in organizational groups, i.e. a battalion engages a
battalion, or a brigade engages a division. So it is appro-
priate to consider a battalion level combat model or a
brigade or division level combat model. This is, in general,
not true in case of air combat.
An F-15 wing might be simultaneously engaged in three
different parts of Europe in three different kinds of air
superiority missions against elements from different enemy
air organizations. An A-10 squadron might have one group of
aircraft engaged over Northern Germany and another operating
in the Southern part. In general it does not make sense in




Another distinction between air battle models and
surface battle models is the firing process. Air battles
tend to have "point" firing processes rather than "area"
firing processes. An aircraft uses its gun by pointing at
or leading a target. This is true in air-to-air combat and
also in air-to-ground attacks. Contrast this with the surface
employment of a minefield, the field-of-fire responsibility
of a machine gun, or the area of an artillery barrage. The
increasing employment of guided munitions in both air-to-air
and air-to-ground missions is consistent with the notion of
"point" rather than "area" fire. Furthermore, in surface-to-
air engagements, radar and IR-guided surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) and radar-directed gunfire are rapidly replacing anti
aircraft barrage fire.
The final aspect of air combat models that is different
from surface models is the way in which the major elements
are attrited. An infantry company can exhibit substantially
different effectiveness characteristics depending on which
10% of its officers and men are killed. A ship may sustain a
fatal hit and yet fight on for a substantial period of time.
The death process for aircraft is considerably more discrete.
The fate of an aircraft hit by a SAM, an air-to-air missile,
or a burst of gunfire is much more likely to be two valued,
that is alive or dead, than would that of a ship hit by a
missile or an infantry company hit by an artillery salvo.
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Each of the characteristics discussed, the homogeneous
environment, the small number of fire and maneuver elements,
the iner-engagement independence, the point fire engagements
process, and the two valued kill mechanism tends to make air
combat earier to understand than ground combat and, there-
fore easier to model to an equivalent level of detail.
It has been argued [Ref. 9:p.32] that in contrast to
land campaign modeling where an hierarchical structure is
required, it is unreasonable for air combat models to map
organizational structure into model structure, so another
frame work must be introduced. The framework most often used
for air combat models involves a structure of an ascending
order of complexity and potential learning about the
processes involved, namely "one-versus-one" , "few-versus- few"
and " force-versus- force" models.
1 . One-Versus-One Air Combat Models
The most detailed physical representations of the
weapon systems in air combat are found at the one-versus-one
level. At this level the physics of the aircraft, SAMS,
radars, anti-aircraft guns, air-to-air, and air-to-ground
missiles are explicitly treated, see [Ref. 48]
.
In an aircraft, effects such as lift, thrust, drag,
angle of attack, airspeed, acceleration and how they all
change as the aircraft maneuvers can be explicitly captured.
Detection processes can be modeled as a function of on-board
avionics, cockpit masking, size of the opponents, radar
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cross section and IR signature. Often a number of different
radar cross sections and IR signatures are modeled as a
function of the spatial relationship between the two
adversaries. [Ref. 49:p.5-14].
This level of model has its maximum utility in
addressing questions of engineering trade-offs. For example,
when contemplating the addition of "leading edge" slats to
an air-to-air fighter aircraft, one has to consider the
disadvantage of the extra weight and drag which is experi-
enced by the aircraft through an entire fight versus the
advantage of improved low speed, instantaneous turn rate.
This turn rate advantage occurs only in the later stages of
the fight when the speeds have decreased considerably.
Another example of engineering tradeoffs that can be exam-
ined at the one-on-one level is a question of the benefit
associated with carrying extra ordnance on an aircraft. Here
it is a question of the effect of the extra weight and drag
versus the benefit of the extra firepower. It must be
considered that in a one-on-one engagement, the additional
firepower may not show up to its full advantage as it would
in a few-on-few engagement where there are more targets
available on which to expend the ordnance.
Care must be taken in one-on-one modeling when
treating a single combat element employed alone versus a
combat element that is intended to function as part of a
system. For example, a strategic bomber may be employed in
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combat as a single entity whereas a given SAM, that may
engage it, is part of a larger air defense system. The
element intended for single employment, the bomber, typi-
cally has all the faculties available that the military
planner felt were necessary to carry out the mission. On
the other hand, since the element that is merely a part of
the system was conceivably intended to contribute to some
synergistic effect of the total system, its effectiveness
is understated if it is considered to engage by itself.
A similar situation can be encountered when using
one-versus-one models in quantity versus quality comparisons
The "quality" aircraft has more on board capability in
general. The "quantity" aircraft may be dependent on the
existence of other capabilities inherent in some larger
system. In addition, the larger numbers and usually higher
sortie rate of the "quantity" aircraft are not captured in
one-versus-one models. In general, one-versus-one based
analysis will favor the "quality" candidate.
Another area that must be treated with considerable
care when using one-on-one models is the way in which the
decision-maker in the system is modeled. For example,
consider the case of an air-to-air combat where decisions
regarding maneuvers against an intelligent enemy are made by
a simulated pilot. Similarly, the simulated enemy pilot
must also be free to maneuver in such a way so as to adapt
his behavior to the combat situation as it develops.
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This caveat is often violated in models of surface-
to-air missiles versus an aircraft. [Ref. 50]. Typically,
the aircraft is constrained to perform a series of pre-
programmed maneuvers and is not capalbe of reacting to the
maneuvers of the missile. On the other hand, the missile's
behavior is modeled so that it can adapt its flight path to
the behavior of the maneuvering target. This can lead to
inappropriate conclusions. The reason for having a pilot in
the aircraft is to get adaptive behavior into the decision
making, as opposed to the programmed decision making that
limits a surface-to-air missile, regardless of its
sophistication.
As stated earlier in this thesis, models can be used
to compare one -system with another, but difficulty can arise
when trying to compute adsolute effectiveness. This is the
case when a one-versus-one model is used for computing
values for use in higher level few-on-few or force-on- force
models. It is essential that the one-on-one model be used in
a way that is consistent with the details of the scenario
under consideration in the few-on-few or force-on- force
models. One factor that must be given careful consideration
is the duration of time for which the one-on-one conflict is
allowed to continue. Often, the one-on-one simulation is
used for longer durations of combat than would be realistic




In addition to being able to explicitly capture the
physics of the situation, another advantage of the one-
versus-one model is that it requires less sophisticated
intelligence information. The intelligence requirements at
the one-on-one level typically involve considerations of
physical capabilities of the system employed, rather than
considerations of employment doctrine, tactics, training,
intentions, and the like. This in itself gives the
one-on-one level model a sounder basis from an intelligence
standpoint.
Finally, one-versus-one is also the level of
modeling where the maximum amount of test data is available
for model verification. Often the ability to validate a
model against actual system performance in the air is much
greater at this level than at any other level of modeling.
Because of the restrictive nature of one-versus-one models
the kind of questions that can be addressed is somewhat
limited. To broaden the nature of the insight that can be
gained, it is necessary to utilize the few-versus-few level
of modeling.
2 . Few-Versus-Few Air Combat Models
As one would expect, the few-vs-few level of
modeling is more complicated than the one-on-one level. The
basic question that must be answered in the consideration of
few-vs-few modeling is how many systems constitutes a few.
There are a number of factors influencing this problem. In
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the case of air-to-air combat, the basic question can be the
air-to-air employment concept of each adversary. For
example, if the enemy "tactical employment concept" is to
use a flight of four aircraft, whereas the "friendly
concept" is to use an element of two aircraft then perhaps
the few-on-few, air-to-air model should be capable of
handling a flight of four aircraft versus two elements of
two aircraft each.
It is somewhat different in the air-to-ground role.
Whether that role be air-to-ground in strategic or theater
level conflict, it is basically the disposition of the
ground forces that determines the size of the few-on-few
engagement. Consider a flight of four A-10 aircraft
attempting to attack, targets in a battalion deployed on the
ground. The number of the targets that the A-lOs can engage
in the ground force is influenced by the way in which the
targets are dispersed over the terrain. The way in which
the ground forces can engage the A-lOs is determined by the
range, capability, and location of their various surface-to-
air defenses. Also how many defenses can engage the attack-
ing aircraft depends upon the tactics employed by the
attacking aircraft. If they are able to ingress to the
target area and egress at very low altitudes, or if they are
able to maneuver sharply, (jinking) , in the target area,
then fewer of the surface-to-air defenses will be able to
engage them or even detect them.
140

Another way to consider the problem of using the
few-vs-few model is to consider the questionof edge effects.
For example, suppose the analyst desires to use a model in
which four A-lOs engage a company of armored vehicles. If
the deployment of the ground forces is such that surface
defenses from other compaines of armored vehicles are able
to engage the A-lOs when they are attacking, then the
results can be biased considerably by the fact that the
analyst ignores the contribution of the defenses of the
surrounding companies
.
It should be recognized that it is at the few-on-few
level that one can first model the synergistic effects that
evolve from a well-planned, well-structured defensive
system. For example, at the one-on-one level, the tactics
that might protect attacking aircraft from being engaged by
an SA-6 surface-to-air missile could very well place the
attacking aircraft in the heart of the engagement envelope
of some other systems in the defensive array of the ground
forces. One gets a considerably different view of the
effectiveness of the air defense system when one considers
it performing as a system.
It is equally true that one gets a different impres-
sion of the effectiveness of air-to-ground aircraft when
they are abole to engage a system of defenses in a way that
is mutually supporting. As the first aircraft "rolls in" to
engage the target, the second aircraft may very well follow
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to engage any defenses that attempt to engage the first
aircraft. The synergistics that exist in both attacking and
defending forces become apparent in well done few-on-few
models
.
The intelligence information required to success-
fully use a few-on-few model is substantially more extensive
than that needed for use of a one-on-one model. For example,
does an adversary commit his aircraft in flights of two or
in flights of four, or in even larger groups? When enemy
fighter bombers are attacked, do they jettison their
ordnance and run, do they jettison their ordnance and fight
back, or do they retain ordnance and attempt to press on to
the target regardless of the attackers?
How are surface-to-air missile systems dispersed
throughout the ground organization, and how do they engage
attacking aircraft? Does the firing doctrine call for firing
more than one SAM at the same aircraft? Does it allow for
firing a number of different types of SAMs simultaneously at
the same aircraft? How do the surface-to-air missile systems
and the antiaircraft artillery systems interact in the
engagement of attacking aircraft? In short, where the one-
on-one level merely required knowledge of engineering
details of the systems, the few-on-few level requires
knowledge of engagement policy, training, employment doctrine
and other more sophisticated intelligence information.
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The question of command and control becomes relevant
at the few-on-few level. How are defenses internetted? For
example, how many Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL) are
assigned to each acquisition radar? Does each TEL have its
own tracking radar? How is the C3 system connected? How
are orders passed along the communications net? How does
the C3 system degrade as part of it is destroyed or if
communications are jammed? All of these questions become
important when one is considering modeling at the few-on-few
level. As a practical matter, it is beneficial to design
the model so that whatever connection scheme is used among
the elements in the ground forces, it can be represented by
entering the appropriate data into the model.
Once one introduces the notion of command, control,
and communication, then the entire question of counter-
measures becomes important. For example, the use of elec-
tronic countermeasures to jam radars, the use of missiles
to destroy acquisition or tracking radars, the use of
communications jamming to force the SAMs and other defenses
to behave autonomously all become a consideration at the
few-on-few level.
The decision process, although present at the
one-on-one level, is particularly complex at the few-on-
few level. [Ref. 51]. In the case of air-to-air combat, the
simulated pilots must react based on information from pre-
flight instructions, from flight and element leaders, and
from their own sensors. In addition, it is reasonable to
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expect they would process this information in accordance
with how the fight was going. For example, if the fight
started out with four aircraft on each side and one side is
down by two aircraft because two have already been destroyed,
it would be reasonable to expect the decision making of the
two surviving pilots to be considerably different than it
was when things were equal.
Another complexity that is introduced for the first
time in the modeling process at the few-on-few level is the
question of what is the appropriate MOE. In air-to-air
combat, one could consider the number of friendly aircraft
lost, the number of enemy aircraft lost, the fraction of
friendly or enemy aircraft lost, the ratio of friendly to
enemy aircraft lost, etc.
The problem of MOE is also complex when one
considers modeling few-on-few air-to-ground combat. Should
the MOE be the number of tanks killed, or the number of
armored fighting vehicles, which includes not only tanks but
also other vehicles? Should the number of surface-to-air
defenses that are destroyed be part of the MOE? In addition,
if some subset of the vehicles assigned to the organization
is to be construed as the MOE, then one must consider the
degree to which the attacking aircraft can ascertain the
difference between a tank and an armored personnel carrier
and a truck or a SAM at the range which their weapons are
employed. Care must be always be exercised in considering
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the way in which the MOE chosen influences the conclusions
that one can draw from using the model to produce an analysis.
The final aspect of the discussion of the few-on-few
modeling is the question of how the model can be validated.
Model validation for few-on-few is considerably more difficult
than it is for one-on-one because of the shortage of data.
However, in recent years, the use of instrumented ranges and
realistic scenarios in training and testing exercises by the
Air Force (USAF) has generated considerable data. Exercises
like RED FLAG have generated data that can be used to
validate models and to promote their use in gaining insight
into processes involved in few-on-few combat.
3. Force-Versus-Force Air Combat
Force-versus-force , or as they are sometimes called,
campaign level models, represent the upper level of a hier-
archically structured group of models. The force-on- force
model typically depends for its fidelity on the detail
captured in the supporting one-on-one and few-on-few models.
As a result of this fidelity, there are a number of questions
that can be examined using the force-on- force model. The
first of these questions is the quantity/quality question.
Since one-on-one and few-on-few models typically involve
equal numbers of aircraft systems, it is difficult to gain
insight into the quantity/quality question where quantity
predominates because it is cheaper. In addition, the
implication is that the "quantity" airolane has fewer
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subsystems and, hence, can be employed at a higher daily
sortie rate. As a minimum, the force-on- force level model
should have sufficient fidelity to capture the essence of
the quantity/quality question.
Another form of question that can be examined using
force-on- force models is the appropriate force mix once you
have decided upon the individual elements. In a strategic
strike force, how many B-52 penetrating bombers, B-52 stand-
off cruise missile carriers, and B-l bombers should be
included? Typically, this is studied by defining the force
mix to be considered and then comparing the effectiveness of
that force mix with some other equal cost mix. In the
theater force situation similar analysis using force-on-
force models is done to determine the mix of air-to-air
specialized, air-to-ground and general purpose systems.
The reason that these questions can be examined
using force-on-force models is that the question can be
addressed using results that have relative rather than abso-
lute validity. Furthermore, it is well to remember that
force-versus-force models cannot be legitimately used to
gain insight into question of how much is enough because of
the absence of absolute validity not only at this level in
the hierarchy but also at the one-on-one and few-on-few
levels
.
Although a number of important insights can be
gained by analysis using force-on-force models, there are
some serious problems associated with their use. The first
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of these problems is the amount of intelligence information
that their use requires. Considerable detail concerning the
scenario is required beyond the traditional questions of
numbers of weapon systems and initial location of military
organizations. Whereas the one-on-one level and the few-
on-few are basically involved with questions of physical
and tactical intelligence data the force-on- forece level
requires insight into the strategic philosophy and strategy
of the opponent. These very "esoteric" considerations do not
appear in the intelligence literature with any consensus in
the community.
Another problem involved with the use of models at
this level is that regarding the duration of the combat to
be modeled. The longer the period considered by the model,
the harder it is to retain thefidelity of the model. For
example, as a war progresses adaptive tactics evolve.
Pilots on both sides attempt to deal with the realities of
the combat they are experiencing by adaptive behavior. In
short, they learn. This is a difficult characteristic to
model. In addition, in a longer duration combat there is the
question of changing the role of the forces. After the
initial three or four days in a conventional war, the
general purpose fighters may be removed from the air-to-air
role and reemployed in the air-to-ground role. The ability
to perfrom this reassignment in real life is quite a bit
more complex than is typically captured in the modeling.
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Duration of combat also has a strong influence on the
amount of detail required in the air base, supply, and main-
tenance systems of the force-on-force model. For example if
only a few hours of the war are to be modeled, then on the
average not more than one sortie can be flown per aircraft,
and details of the supply and maintenance systems are not
required. However, the aircraft shelters and revetments and
the air base runway must be modeled. Since the airfield's
ability to generate sorties will be a function of how well
these facilities survie the attack.
If the combat is to last more than a few hours but
less than about four or five days, then much more of the air
base detail must be modeled. This includes at a minimum,
aircraft and maintenance shelters, runways, maintenance
hangars, fuel, ammunition and spare parts. Once again, these
resources should be put at risk to enemy attacks . The
ability of an airfield to generate sorties should be a func-
tion of how successful the attacks are. The upper limit of
four or five days depends on how many spare parts and how
much consumables are assumed to be on the air base at the
time of the attack, together with the consumption rate of
these resources.
If the combat duration is to last more than four or
five days, then the amount of logistics infrastructure
modeling required increases "exponentially" . Ammo and fuel
dumps, supply depots, maintenance and battle damage repair
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facilities, transportation nets and even computer facilities
on which supply systems are so heavily dependent could all
have a major effect on sortie rate. Logistics pipelines must
be at risk to enemy attacks, and the ability of the e.g.
NATO system to generate combat ready sorties must depend on
success of those attacks. Very few, if any existing force-
on- force battle models include these considerations.
Arguments concerning duration of combat have been
couched in terms of theater force scenarios. Obviously they
also hold for models involving strategic missile and bomber
forces, although the time constraints for which more infra-
structure detail is required are likely to be different.
Another important aspect of force-versus-force or
campaign level modeling is. homogeneity of detail. In the
modeling process, the model builder decides which elements
of the process are important and includes them, while
excluding those elements that are construed to be unimportant
Once an element is included for consideration in the model,
it is important that it be treated at the appropriate level
of detail, so as to not gloss over its true impact on the
combat process. This question of homogeneous level of
detail is very judgemental, as is the question of which char-
acteristics of the combat process are important enough to be
included in the model and which are not.
At the few-on-few level, the idea was introduced
that the decision concerning the MOE is a complicated one.
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This problem is an overwhelming problem at the force-on-
force level. Consider the question of the effectiveness of
strategic nuclear forces employed against the Soviet Union.
There are a number of MOEs available such as hard target
potential, equivalent megatons on target, or fractions of
target base destroyed that could be used as the measure of
evaluation. Each of these MOEs has associated specific
shortcomings and advantages. The problem is to understand
the way in which the MOE biases the outcome obtained using
the model
.
The same problem is there when analyzing force
structure at the theater level of conflict. One traditional
MOE is the number of aircraft killed on each side, or the
number of armored fighting vehicles destroyed on each side.
It may be considerably more important in conventional
theater conflict to consider the degree to which the adver-
sary's ability to deliver nuclear weapons has been reduced.
This addresses his ability to escalate to the nuclear level,
and indeed his propensity to cross the nuclear threshold in
the first place.
Although this section is devoted to considerations of
air combat models at the force-on- force level, it is often
necessary to combine an air combat model with a ground
combat model to capture the constribution of air to the
ultimate measure of that contribution, the prosecution of
the ground war. All of the difficulties that have been
addressed previously concerning the greater complexity of
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ground combat, should be considered. In addition, the analyst
must be concerned with the sensitivity of the gound battle
model to timing and maneuver, not just to fire power. For
example, a tactical fighter force can be employed in the
morning in the North German front and in the afternoon in the
South German front. Such an employment flexibility can only
be captured in a combat model that correctly treats the
maneuver of forces as a function of time.
The problem arising from the marriage of air and
ground models at the theater level is most severe for the
close air support (CAS) and battlefield interdiction (BI)
missions. These missions represent an important linkage
between the air and ground battles and as such require
careful consideration by the modeler. This is particularly
true in the situation where two battle models which were
developed separately are then joined at some later date. The
linkage question can also be a problem when a model was
built as either an air or ground model, and then the other
portion was added later.
Timing problems can arise from the linkage of air
and ground battle models. The time constants that charac-
terize ground force movement, engagement of ground forces,
and reconstitution of ground forces tend to be longer than
the time constants that describe these same processess for
air forces. If a ground battle model is built to account
for the slower ground processess, it may not be able to
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reflect adequately the fact that during the course of one
ground engagement the air forces may have engaged, reconsti-
tuted and reengaged three times.
In one ground battle model that has been used for
some time, the targets destroyed by CAS and BI sorties were
removed from the ground order of battle once every 24 hours,
at midnight. Targets destroyed by ground forces were removed
at the time the destruction took place. This approach
severely understates the responsiveness of theater air
forces. The approach was used as a simple modeling solution
to the problem of double killing of targets, i.e. having a
CAS sortie attack targets killed by ground fire (which may
occur to some degree) , or ground forces attack targets
killed by CAS sorties (which may occur to some degree)
.
This highlights the tendency to model some of these complex
command and control processes with convenient but overly
simple modeling techniques.
A further complication along these lines concerns
the question of allocation of CAS and BI sorties to various
locations across the theater. The linkage between ground and
air combat models usually requires the development of some
set of rules for allocating CAS and BI sorties to various
parts of the battle. In general, it is best to avoid alloca-
tion rules that are based on planning factors . It may be
appropriate to plan to provide a certain number of CAS
sorties for each engaged division, or for each kilometer of
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front line. However, to use these planning factors for allo-
cation decisions seriously understates the ability of air
forces to mass in the air battle model in order to respond
to developments occuring in the ground battle model. It is
much more realistic to have the air resources allocated as
a function of the progress of the ground battle.
4 . Very Aggregated Air Battle Models
It is true that proceeding from one-on-one to few-
on-few to many-on-many has inherent in it an aggregation
process, i.e. as one goes up the hierarchy, one sacrifices a
level of detail in order to consider broader aspects of the
process. There is often a tendency to want to go one level
above the force-on- force or many-on-many level to what can
be considered very aggregated air battle models. Often this
process is accompanied by the use of some optimization
algorithm that varies the employment decisions in such a way
as to optimize some MOE. This may be done in a static way or
it may be done over a period of time as in the dynamic
programming approaches that are used at this very aggregated
level of modeling. Often the entire theater war, including
air and ground battle, will be reduced to three or four
variables describing each side. This would appear to be too
high a level of aggregation to give any insight into the
process
.
Another example of overaggragation at the high level
of modeling concerns use of Lanchester equations to describe
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campaign level combat. The difficulty is that the form of
the model drives the results in a way that, often, does not
reflect the reality of the combat situation. For example,
those conditions that must be satisfied to use the "linear
law" are generally not satisfied in the air-to-air combat.
Those hypotheses necessary to use the Lanchester "square
law" are, typically not set in air-to-air combat either with
the possible exception of beyond-visual-range engagements
among aircraft that have radar missile capabilities.
Yet Lanchester- type models in this very aggregated
way will probably determine the outcome. For example, in a
quantity/quality comparison the "linear law" favors the
quality system, whereas the "square law" favors the quantity
system. Even though neither choice reflects the realities of
the combat situation and the hypotheses necessary to derive
the model, the outcome follows predictably and automatically.
Perhaps 10 or 15 years ago substantial insights
could be gained by using these very aggregated models. But
air combat-modeling has progressed beyond the stage where
new insights are to be gained from modeling the attrition
process in this elementary way. It is conceivable that
processes and models that were less well studied, such as
command and control processes, reconnaissance processes, and
decision-making processes, may benefit from some highly
aggregated study. This suggests that the appropriate role
for these highly aggregated models is diagnostic: i.e., to
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guide the analyst and model builder toward the proper
construction and employment of force-on-force level models,





Doctrine of Tactical Air Operations
In the first paragraph of this thesis the doctrinal
mission of the Tactical Air Operations is stated. A broader
approach will be attempted in the present section to orient
the future modeller-analyst in understanding and modeling
the problems of Tactical Air Campaigns.
The air campaign involves many missions that go far
beyond air combat to include those of aircraft in ground
support and attack and of ground weapons opposing them.
Surface operations depend upon friendly air opera-
tions to create and maintain a favorable environment for
land and sea forces to exploit their mobility.
The flexibility and firepower of tactical air
readily enhance not only land forces but also naval forces
.
Tactical air may be employed in concert with, or act inde-
pendently of, friendly naval units to secure and maintain




For continuous operations, air superiority is
essential. Sea operations conducted adjacent to areas
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dominated by enemy air forces require action to gain control
of air.
Success in any armed conflict may require tactical
air forces to perform operations of:
1. counter air
2. close air support and
3. interdiction operation
simultaneously with limited assets. Intelligence, derived
from reconnaissance, surveillance and other sources, must
provide warning, permitting decision makers to apply
tactical air power in the most efficient manner. Aerial
refueling, electronic warfare, defense suppression, special
operations, tactical airlift, airborne warning and control,
and search and rescue operations are capabilities that
enhance the flexibility and survivability of tactical air
powe r [Ref. 1
:
p . 3 ]
.
How these forces are integrated and employed will
determine the effectiveness of tactical air power. Command,
control, communications, intelligence and interoperability
will provide the essential mechanism to integrate and employ
the forces
.
Figure 4.1 from [Ref. 1] presents the existing
doctrinal integration of US Tactical Air Forces. The author
points out the omission from the chart of the Tactical
Support Maritime Operations (TASMO) , but that is due to
different organizational structure of the US Armed Forces,
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planned to operate in a "global" environment, in comparison
to other Air Forces which are called to operate in smaller
scale environments.
Analyzing the above doctrine of employment of the
Tactical Air Force we see that it involves many missions.
Trying to design models to aid in making weapons choices and
force structure decisions, as well as force employment
concepts for a given force structure is a highly complicated
process
.
However, it must not be lost sight of that, while
aircraft must attack each other and defend themselves, their
primary reason for being (in theater warfare) is to support
the ground forces, and the ultimate measure of effectiveness
is ground attrition, especially of tanks and other vehicles
killed in CAS and battlefield interdiction.
This is incidentially, institutionally difficult, in
the Air Force pilots become aces for shooting down planes,
not shooting up tanks. Nevertheless, aircraft do not take
and hold territory.
If the basic objective of Tactical Air Force is to
support the ground forces, the above comments suggest the
extensive complex of roles played by TAF in achieving this
objective
.
Clearly, the struggle for air superiority is a domi-
nant theme. Douhet [Ref. 9:p.v-2] perceived almost 65 years
























































CAPAJILITIES REOUIPXO FOR SUCCESFUL TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS
• ELECTRONIC WARFARE
• SEARCH AND R£SCUC
• AEROSPACE CONTROL
• AERIAL REFUEL INC
• DEFENSE SUPPRESSION
Figure 4.1. The Integration of Tactical Air Operations
Force would then be free to attack ground targets unimpeded.
At that time, his scenario was understood by one side which
prepared to achieve command of the air, while the other side
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did not. One assumes today a mutual perception of the
problem in a similar way by all the sides.
In the first place, ground support may mean CAS at
the FEBA or combat area (since the FEBA is likely in the
future not to be of the classic linear and well-defined
form) as well as to the rear. The above includes water
territory in the notion of ground support.
How far in the rear is a good question. For a few
tens of kilometers back, the flow of new material toward the
front provides a potential class of targets that will affect
the battle in hours or days. Farther back, staging areas,
ammo dumps, dispersed vehicles, repair depots, bridges and
other transportation nodes, etc. are targets the destruction
of which can affect the battle in days to weeks . Deeper
interdiction can attempt to prevent longer-term reinforce-
ment and indeed to destroy the base of both support and
morale on which any army ultimately depends.
The menu of ground targets is, then rich. But the
choices cannot be made solely in terms of predicted impact
on the ground battle, a difficult and uncertain enough task
in itself.
Given that resources are scarce, and virtually fixed
from the point of view of the commander of a battle, every
use of an aircraft is at the expense of some alternative
use. CAS means less interdiction to the rear. Both mean
less defense versus enemy CAS and interdiction, less
159

suppression of his defenses (destruction of ground defenses,
C3, and air bases, and less resources with which to defeat
his aircraft in combat.
This is an opportunity-cost view of the trade-offs.
These trade-offs can also be looked at in terms of their
synergistic effects. The more successful the defense suppres-
sion and achievement of air superiority, the easier and more
successful will be the CAS and interdiction missions, and
the less successful will be the enemy in these misssions.
Every planner and commander assumes that the answer
to the choices above is a MIX, of missions and equipment
[Ref . 9 :p.v-4]
.
C. SQUADRON'S PERFORMANCE SIMULATION
The following clarifications and mainly the associated
flow chart in Appendix "A", presents very briefly a simula-
tion logic of how a combat squadron may be simulated or
evaluated during its mission interactions, and as a result
of this evaluation one may conclude about the overall
performance of that type of weapon system.
The flow of logic focuses on how one will predict a
manned aircraft's weapons systems performance in the level
of an attack squadron under a variety of mission conditions.
Figure 4.2 presents the possible interactions in a
similar modeling process according to a scenario. The










































Figure 4.2. Overall Logic of Interactions
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targets to be attacked. The performance of a manned tactical-
attack aircraft varies considerably with the nature of the
targets, the surrounding terrain, enemy defenses, weather
and operational techniques, just to rename some of the
factors
.
The fundamental parts a modeler can consider in this
kind of modeling-simulation are:
1. Operational Regime: The intended mission types for
the specific weapon system, considering target
characteristics and enemy defenses, mission frequency,
number of aircraft deployed, and aircraft
characteristics
.
2. Effectiveness measure: The criteria to measure the
performance of the system, the number of targets
eliminated, and the cost in men and material.
3. Support concept: The support activities, ranging
from those directly tied to the aircraft rearming,
refueling, and servicing, to the logistics pipeline
with associated costs and time factors.
4. Limited resources: Solutions to problems like this
are obtained much more readily if the system is
assumed to have everything necessary when needed.
Unfortunately this is not true in almost any case.
The number of aircraft in the squadron, number and
skill of support personnel, spares, and amount of
support activities are all limited.
162

5. Tie-in with Existing Systems: These could range from
the skill of the flight crew, based on their level of
training, to the logistics support concept employed
and repair at the squadron level versus replacement.
The interlocking "submodels" as a general guideline are
shown in Figure 4.2 also and are the following:
1. Targets to be eliminated in the form of mission
requests with the characteristics of anticipated
mission profiles.
2. Maintenance of the aircraft by the squadron environ-
ment with replenishment activities and support
resources
.
3. The individual aircraft flights composed of penetra-
tion to the target, attack, and return to base.
4. Evaluation of mission-either elimination of target or
the requirement for another mission to continue the
attack.
These five fundamental parts as well as their inter-
actions can be combined in an almost infinite number of ways
This is why a scenario is necessary. The scenario will
establish the time and the sequence the squadron will
eliminate the targets. Furthermore a control will be main-
tained to output characteristics of important situations.
The overall performance will be measured in terms of
availability, dependability, and capability.
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The mission may be subdivided into phases of the mission
like: Preflight, Penetration, Attack, Return, Landing, and
Mission Evaluation. In turn each of these mission phases
can be remodeled and reevaluated in accordance to system
analysis needs.




V. ICARUS AIR COMBAT MODEL
In this part of the thesis a demonstration model, named
ICARUS, will be described. The purpose of the model is not
to solve any real world situation or to be an example of
an "ideal" model but to give some insight to the beginning
analyst concerned in air combat modeling.
A. GENERAL MODEL DESCRIPTION
ICARUS is a highly aggregated two-sided deterministic
simulation algorithm comprised of interaction equations
which utilize the allocation of aircraft to various missions
(MIX) to obtain the outcome of offensive vs defensive Air
Force engagements. The algorithm is based on study of more
than 20 Theater-Level models but specifically on the
LULUJIAN-I, general non-nuclear warfare model developed by
WSEG, see [Ref. 52], It can be used as a basis for a
computer simulation program to train student analysts in air
combat modeling and the associated issues.
The theater of operations involves two sides with their
respective air forces. Figure 5.1 provides a general repre-
sentation of the forces and the types of interactions
included in this model.
Each side has four forward operating bases which are
vulnerable to attack by the opponent. Aircraft replacement
and supplies are generated from a sanctuary base located in
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Figure 5.1. Depiction of ICARUS Air Operations
the rear of the sector. The sanctuary base is assumed to be
invulnerable to attack.
The theater of operations is divided into two well
defined territories by a line called FEBA (Forward Edge of
Battle Area)
.
For the most part, ICARUS is a "pure" Air Operations
model which excludes interactions with the other branches
(Army-Navy) not because that is "tactically real" but in
order to simplify the model. A reference to the FEBA will
indicate interactions with enemy ground forces.
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The ground forces are defined in terms of homogeneous
divisions with no distinction between armored, infantry, or
tank division. The primary purpose of the RED side is to
occupy territory while BLUE's goal is to slow the rate of
movement of the FEBA as much as possible.
The direction and rate of movement of FEBA depends upon
the relative strength of the opposing forces.
The supply system initiating from the sanctuary area is
modeled as pipeline running toward the FEBA. This supply
line is under the influence of enemy interdiction attacks
which would reduce the rate of "spare supplies" on the
specific day.
The ground forces defend against attacking aircraft by
AAA, and SAMs
.




A restricted attack aircraft
A special close air support aircraft
A special mission aircraft
The multi-purpose fighter is able to perform most of
the tactical air operations missions while the rest are
limited to a particular role (bomber or attack) . The





The decision makers, users RED and BLUE, can allocate
eight (8) air missions provided for in the model:
1. Air Base Attack (ABA)
2. Interdiction (INTD)
3. Reconnaissance (RECCE)
4. Combat Air Patrol (CAP)
5. Close Air Support (CAS)
6. Air Defense (AIRDEF)
7. Defense Suppression (DEFSP)
8. Escort (ESCORT)
A brief discussion will be given concerning the notion
of the missions mentioned above and a detailed analysis will
be presented in the Air War section.
In the ABA mission, see Figure 5.1, offensive strikes
are aimed at enemy air bases to destroy enemy aircraft on
the ground, patroleum (POL) , munitions, and to disrupt
operations of the airbases
.
The purpose of the INTD mission is to damage, destroy,
or delay logistics support for enemy ground units engaged in
battle. Successful INTD missions will create a delay in
arrival of resupplies and will also reduce their quantity.
The RECCE mission improves the accuracy of information
about enemy airfields and ground forces. Flying RECCE
missions against a target will give information about the
status of supplies and logistics located at the target.
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CAP missions attempt to gain and maintain air superiority
over the main battle area. These missions will tend to
increase the effectiveness and reduce the losses of CAS.
The CAS missions attack enemy ground units engaged in
combat with friendly forces. They have two principal
effects. First, they produce causalties among ground units,
and second they influence the movement of the FEBA by
causing causalties, disrupting coordination, and slowing
troop movement.
The AIRDEF missions are aircraft on alert at designated
bases and are used to protect that airbase from attack. In
addition, they protect territory behind the forward defenses
from enemy aircraft which have penetrated the missile defense
zone.
DEFSP missions are designed to destroy or suppress enemy
ground-to-air defenses by clearing corridors for subsequent
penetrations by aircraft on INTD or ABA missions.
Escort missions accompany primary mission aircraft, such
as ABA, and engage enemy interceptors. These missions are
part of a "mission package" concept or the so called "Joint
Combined Raids" (JCR) used by the United States Air Force
(USAF) in which attack aircraft (strike) are accompanied by
properly configured escort and defense suppression aircraft.
These escorts will reduce the losses to the primary mission
aircraft from enemy interceptors and ground defenses.
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However, the "cost" is in terms of what one must sacrifice to
provide the escort package.
a. Assumptions
The following assumptions are made in this model:
(a) The conflict is a conventional war. Nuclear or
chemical weapons are not modeled.
(b) Intangible quantities such as leadership and
training are equal for each side and are not treated.
(c) Weather is not treated.
(d) Different types of munitions are not considered.
(e) Command, control, and communications are not a
factor.
(f) Air refueling, search and rescue, and aircrew
training are not modeled.
(g) No distinction is made between a daylight cycle
or a nightime cycle.
b. Limitations
This model is intended to be an educational tool, and
is not meant to give real world results. Data contained in
the model are either fictitious or from unclassified pub-
lished models. Many of the details of war gamming are
deliberately suppressed in ICARUS since it is not meant to
be an explicit representation of real-world events. However,
the model should allow the reader to gain insights into the




1. Tactical Air War Module (TAWM)
The TAWM consists of logic and engagement equations
describing the various missions and allocations of tactical





*Air-to-air interactions modeled as "many-on-many"
*Penetration of barrier, area, and point SAMs and AAA
Interdiction of aircraft in shelters and in the open
Attrition of aircraft
Effective sorties by type and mission
A standard force is assumed built into the model to
provide each side with four different types of aircraft.
Each type possesses its own performance characteristics and
capabilities reflected in a " destructive index " for that
type. In general the BLUE side possesses more effective
aircraft systems which can counter the numerical advantage
of RED's ground forces if they are employed effectively.
The user may change the standard numbers to his will.
The four types of aircraft are distributed at four
airbases lying 300 kilometers behind the FEBA. Prior to the
start of each day's activities, there is an opportunity to
rearange the "order of battle" by allocating the aircraft
available from one base to another.
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One major decision is the percentage of support for
the ground forces to be allocated; the user can do that
according to his own estimate of the situation.
Aircraft may be allocated only to missions they are
capable of. Table IV list the mission capabilities for each
aircraft for each side.
The air defense of a particular base must be per-
formed by aircraft located at the base. For example if BLUE
has 20 F-4 aircraft at base 2, he can not allocate more than
20. If he decides to allocate more, he has to deploy air-
craft from other bases before or at the start of the
operations. Once both sides have finished allocating
forces the model will calculate the losses and provide a
quantitative assessment of the air missions.
Although it is desirable that the model's outcome is
credible, primary emphasis is given on the effect of
strategy and employment tactics on the total outcome of the
battle.
B. THE ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY AND LOGIC
Now a more detailed presentation of the included tactical
air missions of the ICARUS model will be given.
1. Air Base Attack (ABA)
The air base attack sorties have been one of the
most effective methods of countering enemy air forces. They






















































on the ground and disrupting base support facilities such
as runways, taxiways, or maintenance facilities. All of
these actions serve to reduce the enemy's ability to
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generate sorties. However, several defensive measures are
employed to minimize the impact of air base attack. Aircraft
shelters and revetments protect aircraft on the ground.
Improved surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and a effective de-
ployment of anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) have posed a seri-
ous attrition threat to air base attack aircraft. As a re-
sult of these defenses, a complex set of strategies is avail-
able to the attacker in terms of "mission package", protect-
ing the main strike force with escort and/or defense sup-
pression aircraft. The ICARUS air model is designed to
reflect the impact of "mission package" on the outcome of
the battle.
The treatment of the air base attack mission in the
ICARUS model is oversimplified. The computations are based
on highly aggregated interactions between the two opposing
forces. Aircraft shelters and revetments are not treated in
the model. However, AAA, SAMs, and attrition due to AAA,
SAMs, and air defenders is calculated. A general flow of
the attack mission is depicted in Figure 5.2.
Treatment of the attrition from AAA and SAMs embodies
a relative static and predictable array of defenses. AAA
loss rate are considered to be the same for all aircraft,
and all aircraft must penetrate the coverage of these weapons
SAM units are deployed in two locations, along the FEBA and




Suppression aircraft reduce the number of SAM sites
available to fire missiles at the attack force.
Attrition due to air defenders is dynamic (stochastic)
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Figure 5.2 Mission Package Flow Sequence
The maximum number of aircraft which each airbase
can support is initially input as data. As the base status
is reduced by repeated airbase attack sorties , the number
of aircraft which the base can support is proportionately
reduced. The amount of reduction is a function of:
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The " Effective Sorties " which can reach the bases
and the " Operational Index " for the types of aircraft which
attack the base.
"Effective Sorties" are defined as those attackers
which survive the AAA and SAM threats and are not detected
and engaged by the defenders. Attackers who are detected
and engaged by air defense aircraft are assumed to "jettison"
(drop) their bomb load. Those attackers detected and
engaged have some probability that they will be shot down
by the defenders.
The "Operational index" is defined as a figure which
expresses the amount of contribution per aircraft type,
sortie numbers, and mission type (CAS-ABA) to reduction of
the functional ability of the target (Base) to support
further. In Table V, the data presented are arbitrarily
assigned and the analyst may adjust them to different values
if desired.
a. Interdiction (INTD)
Interdiction missions attempt to damage, destroy, or
neutralize support and logistics received by enemy ground
units. Destruction of POL and munitions in the logistics
pipelines has more immediate effect on the level of
intensity of the conflict than the destruction of command
and control facilities.
In the model the interdiction sorties may be split
into two components: those that attack air base supply
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routes and those that attack army supply lines. Interdiction
sorties are subject to the same threats experienced by the
air base attack sorties. The model will react to successful
interdiction sorties against a logistics line by reducing
the number of spare parts which the base can receive from
the sanctuary depot.
In a similar manner, the model will react to succes-
sful interdiction missions against the ground forces by
either slowing or accelerating the "rate of advance" or the
FEBA.
TABLE V
Operational Index for Aircrafts vs Missions


















Accurage intelligence is essential in the successful
conduct of an air war especially since resources are limited
and attrition is high. Maximum efficiency from limited
capability can only be achieved if the information on which
decisions are based is timely and accurate.
In ICARUS, information about the status of enemy air
bases and ground forces may be obtained through the use of
reconnaissance missions. These sorties have no damaging
effect on enemy status but are capable of defending them-
selves if attacked. In order to obtain RECCE information
about a particular target, at least one RECCE sortie must
survive. For example, if 4 RECCE aircraft were sent
against an airbase, and none of them survived, no intelli-
gence information would be available for the status of
that base. However, if even one of them returns, the
status of the target would be available.
c. Defense Suppression (DEFSP)
Defense suppression missions suppress and destroy
enemy ground-to-air defensive in the vicinity of the ground
combat zone and the area between the FEBA and the air bases
.
Aircraft allocated to this mission will reduce ground-to-
air losses of other mission aircraft. Employment of suppres-
sion aircraft will open a corridor for the attack aircraft
to penetrate ground defenses. However, by allocating air-
craft to the suppression mission, a commander is using
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aircraft which might be used for one of the other missions
(CAS, ABA, etc)
.
The model views the suppression aircraft as preceeding
the main attack force to clear a corridor for these aircraft
(see Figure 5.2). The number of SAM sites encountered by
the main attack force is less than the original deployment
of SAM sites because of SAM site suppression. This is
calculated by the model by modifying the expected number of
SAMs shot at each aircraft by the fraction of SAM sites
surviving suppression,
d. Escort (ESCORT)
Escort sorties accompany the primary mission aircraft
to the target and engage enemy interceptors. Escorts are
used as part of a mission package along with defense
suppression in an attempt to counter enemy defenses. The
cost is in terms of what one must sacrifice to provide the
escort package.
Allocating aircraft to the escort missions in ICARUS
will reduce attacker losses due to air defense aircraft.
Escort missions can be assigned to accompany the deep
penetrators (ABA or INTD) an the interdiction of the Army's
supply lines. Each escort sortie reduces the effective
number of enemy air defense sorties according to a simple
subtractive rule. The use of escort sorties is examined
more closely in the section on aircraft losses.
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e. Air Defense (AIRDEF)
Air defense sorties nay be split into two components:
Those that are deployed forward near the FEBA (CAP) and
Those that are used for defense of the rear areas
(AIRDEF)
.
CAP missions attempt to gain and maintain air superi-
ority by attacking enemy aircraft which enter the forward
combat zone surrouding the FEBA. They are used primarily
to protect friendly ground forces from enemy CAS sorties
and army logistics lines from enemy interdiction. AIRDEF
missions are normally on alert. When early warning radar
detects an incoming hostile force, the air defenders are
"scrambled" (quick, take-off) to intercept the air threat.
Air defense also protects friendly air bases and supply
lines in the rear of the battle area from enemy air attacks.
Air defense aircraft attack enemy interdiction, air base
attack, and reconnaissance aircraft and their escorts.
Additionally they reduce the effectiveness of those attackers
that survive by forcing some pilots to jettison their
ammunitions.
The effectiveness of an air defense sortie is modeled
in ICARUS probabilisticaly . The likelihood that an air
defense aircraft detects an intruder is heavily dependent
on the assistance the defensive aircraft receives regarding
the location of intruder aircraft. The model attempts to
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capture the situation in which the air defense search process
is essentially autonomous and the probability of detection
(Pd) is sensitive to the number of intruders in the friendly
air space. Hence, Pd is proportional to the number of
opportunities for making a detection. The model also assumes
that intruders who are detected and engaged but not shot
down will jettison their ammunitions and return to base.
f. Close Air Support (CAS)
The Army depends on CAS to assist in countering large
concentrations of enemy forces. CAS missions attack enemy
ground units in actual combat with friendly forces. Air
power provides the fastest means of significantly affecting
the ground battle. Since most CAS sorties require visual
acquisition of ground forces, weather and darkness are
significant factors. Normally CAS would be allocated to
units faced with a distinct force disadvantage.
Since the model considers only one section of the
FEBA, there is no decision on where to allocate the CAS
sorties. Weather and darkness are not treated in the model
resulting in uniform effectiveness for CAS. Of course
addition of weather or a night cycle will improve the
model's treatment of the CAS mission.
2 . Aircraft Losses
Aircraft allocated to attack enemy air bases will
supper attrition due to anit-aircraft artillery (AAA) or
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surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) which are located along the
FEBA and between the FEBA and the air bases.
The aircraft which survive up to that point may then
be engaged with enemy air defense aircraft in air battle
where a loss may be sustained on both sides. Attack air-
craft which survive the air defense then proceed to their
designated targets.
The ability of the SAM defense to kill attack
aircraft may be reduced by allocating (assigning) SAM
suppression missions. These aircraft precede the main
attack force to "clear" a corridor for the attackers and
mainly to allow them to penetrate the enemy defense. Also
by allocating aircraft to escort attackers will reduce
attack losses due to air interceptions. The escorts will
engage the air defenders first and consequently will reduce
the number of air defenders which can engage in interceptions
with attack aircraft. So SAM suppression and escort missions
are critical elements in the air warfare scenario.
Air-to-air losses will be calculated in terms of
"probability of survival of an attack sortie" using the
P SA = e
"a/b (eqn 5.1)
exponential form: where,
P_A = The Probability an offensive sortie survives
a = Function of number of air defense sorties
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b = Function of number of offensive sorties
a/b = engagement ratio
This exponential form is derived from the Poisson
probability distribution and expresses the concept of
"diminishing returns" per weapon. The effects in this
case are multiple or overlapping. Thus, the expected number
of attackers or defenders killed is not simple proportional
to the number of aircraft used. Figure 3.5 depicts the
concept presented. Once the defender has achieved about a
two-to-one ratio i.e. engagement ration = 2, over the
ENGAGEMENT RATIO
Figure 5.3 The Engagement Ratio on Attackers Survivability
attacker, vary little is gained in terms of decreasing the
attacker's probability of survival. In that case the
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attacker should attempt to concentrate his forces as much as
possible
.
One way to do this concentration is with the use of
escort sorties. The model assumes that each escort sortie
will reduce the number of air defenders available to detect
and engage a bomber sortie by a specific number according to
a simple subtractive rule. Thus, if a mission A contains 50
bombers and 20 escorts against 30 defenders, only 10 defen-
ders would be "eligible" to detect and engage the 50 bombers
The other 20 defenders would be occupied by the escorts.
Now suppose another mission B which contains 70 bombers and
no escorts against 30 defenders. All of the defenders
would be available to detect and engage the bombers. On
mission A the engagement ratio of defenders to bombers is
10/50 (.20), and on mission B the ratio is 30/70 (.43).
In Figure 5.3 it is indicated that the probability of
survival for bombers on mission A is (.82) and the prob-
ability for bombers on mission B is (.65) . Hence, the use
of escorts increases the probability of survival of mission
A bombers by (.17) over mission B bombers.
3. Movement of FEBA
In this part of the thesis a very aggregated indica-
tion of the air war interactions and the influence in the
total assessment will be demonstrated through the ICARUS
model to show the effects of air support to the ground
battle. However, it is stressed that the model will not
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concentrate in that area (land combat) since as explained in
previous text land warfare is more complicated than the
whole air war module of any associated theater level model.
Since we assume that the RED forces (army) start the
battle with larger number of forces than the BLUE (army)
,
RED consequently will advance and the FEBA will always start
moving in a forward direction (as seen by RED) . The RED
side is always advancing, and BLUE is attempting to slow the
movement. The rate of FEBA movement will depend on the
relative strengths of the opposing forces.
As was mentioned in mission analysis, "effective
close air support" will influence the rate of FEBA movement.
CAS sorties produce causalties in proportion to the
" Operational Index (01)" of the aircraft involved. The "index"
accounts for damage due to disrupting troop coordination,
slowing troop movements, and creating an adverse psycholo-
gical effect on the opponent, [Ref. 55:p.30]. As mentioned
in the previous sections, a shortage of spares will produce
a slowdown of an army's ability to move the FEBA.
A rather simple mathematical expression developed
by RAND Corporation [Ref. 56: p. 25] indicates that the average
motion of the FEBA may be described using the "effective
force ration", F, defined as:




M = the number of attacking division equivalents
slow = The logistics slowdown factor of the attacker
SCAS = The number of the attacker's effective CAS
sorties
,
01 = The operational index of the attacker's CAS
aircraft, and
M(d)slow, SCAS(d), 01(d) are the defender's factors.
The daily movement of the FEBA is then expressed as
a function of the effective force ration (see next section
for a detailed explanation of the functions)
.
C. THE ANALYTICAL FORMULATIONS OF AIR COMBAT
The interaction equations for the offensive and defensive
engagements in the air combat model are presented below.
Many of the approaches used in the air model ICARUS were
adopted from the routines in the LULEJIAN-I modifications,
[Ref. 52]. Following a brief presentation of ground inter-
action equations will be presented which were adopted from
the Rand Model TAGS [Ref. 56].
a. SAM Suppression and AAA
The following assumptions apply:
(a) Suppression aircraft precede attack aircraft.
(b) Sites being suppressed get first shot at attackers,
(c) SAM sites are suppressed for one day only. A
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c. Aircraft Losses
The model may use the Monte-Carlo method (subroutine
RANDOM) to determine the number of aircraft killed given the
number of aircraft engaged and the probability an aircraft
is killed. RANDOM calculates kills using a binomial criterion.
Each encounter is treated as an independent Bernoulli trail.
For each encounter a random number can be drawn, if the
random number is less than the Pk of the Attacker, the air-
craft is considered killed. Otherwise the aircraft survives
but is assumed to have jettisoned its ordnance load. The
attacking aircraft which survive the ground-to-air defense
and are not engaged by the air defenders are sent against the
opposing air base for final computations. For the air base









STAT = base status
fi = Operational Index for the type i aircraft
ni = Number of type i aircraft
The number of sorties an airbase can support is then
computed:
NSORT = MAX x STAT (eqn 5.5)
where,
NSORT = Number of sorties an airbase can support
MAX = maximum number of sorties an airbase can support
if fully operational
STAT = base status
Interdiction sorties reduce the number of spares
received by an opponent in the following manner:
INTDi
SPARES. = SUPPLY x (.99 5) (ean 5.6)
l
where
SPARES = Number of spares received daily by base i,
SUPPLY = Maximum supply capability of the logistics
network,
INTD = Number of effective interdection sorties




The daily movement of the FEBA, called FDME , can be
expressed as a function of the effective force ratio, F, in
the form:





VMAX = Maximum velocity of the FEBA against negligible
opposition XI, X2 , X3,...Xs are constant INPUT by the
analyst [Ref. 56:p.ll].
Figure 5.4 indicates how the movement rate is affected
by selection of the constants. The value of the constants
XI, X2 , X3 , and X4 have been adapted from the Rand model
TAGS.
Daily troop casualties inflicted by CAS are a function
of the number and type of aircraft involved. The total














Figure 5.4 Effect of Selected Constants of FEBA Movement Rate
CCAS = M 1-exp E DiSi/M
i=l
(eqn 5.8)
where, M = Number of enemy divisions
Di = Operational index for type i aircraft
Si = Number of successful friendly CAS sorties of
type i aircraft.
D. SCORING SYSTEM
The score which will be given to each side at the end of
the run will be computed using two results:
a. The cumulative FEBA movement and
b. The aircraft exchange ratio for each side.
The future user may select different weights but as




FEBA Movement weight is 50 percent
Exchange Ratio weight is 50 percent
The FEBA ratio, FRATIO can be calculated on the basis of
cumulative FEBA movement to nominal FEBA movement.
FRATIO = TFEBA/NCM
where
TFEBA = The cumulative FEBA movement during the duraction
of the simulation.
NOM = The nominal FEBA movement built in the model (Average
constant)
.
Once the FEBA ratio is computed, a score can be given
per side as follows:
RED Ground Score = FRATIO * 50
BLUE Ground Score = 1/FRATIO * 50
The Exchange Ratio can be calculated as follows:
Loss ratio for each side:
BRATIO = BLOST/BTOT
RRATIO = RLOST/RTOT
where BRATIO, RRATIO = Loss ratio for each side
BLOST, RLOST = Number of aircraft lost by each side
BTOT, RTOT = Original number of aircraft plus daily
reinforcements for each side.
The Exchange Ratio, ERATIO, then can be calculated as




Exchange ratio has been traditionally used to express
relative success in air-to-air combat in terms of enemy
aircraft killed per friendly aircraft killed. Scores for the
air portion can be computed as follows:
RED AIR SCORE = ERATIO * 50
BLUE AIR SCORE = 1/ERATIO * 50
The total score can be computed by summing the air and
ground scores.
It should be noted that the measure of performance
demonstrated in this model is one of many other choices,
depending upon the situation and the utility of the commander,
the use of other MOEs would be equally or more valid. For
example rate of kill, force drawndown, and enemy causalties
are some. The reader will review the section about MOEs for
a more indepth discussion.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The following conclusions are given as a final effort of
the author to give some insight in Air Combat Models to
interested analysts.
A. GENERAL
The problem of modeling a complex military function such
as Air Force Systems is monumental. It is not a task which
can be accomplished within a few weeks, but will take the
combined efforts of several people for months.
The above facts are not starting but are added only so
that the reader might be aware that the more specific
conclusions presented are applicable only within the context
of the assumptions made and are not offered as an exact •
answer to any real world problem. Rather, the conclusions
are used to support technique and encourage further work in
this area.
B. SPECIFIC
1. Prospects for Theater-Level Models
The usefulness and use of theater-level models have
been steadily increasing in recent years. Theater-level
models, despite their obvious and not so obvious limitations,
are finding increasing acceptance at high levels. Theater-
level models are almost the only alternative to intuition
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and organized judgment when examining a large scale war.
The basis for intuition and judgment is rapidly disappearing
as World War II recedes into the past and it becomes
increasingly evident that Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli War
in 1973 have only limited applicability to a war in Europe.
One needs models that combine tactical and technological
innovation.
The direction of development of theater-level models
is primarily toward command, control, and communications.
The C3 problem is closely related to intelligence, target
acquisition, and electronic warfare. The next generation of
theater-level models almost certainly will incorporate
explicit decision-making (allocations) with incomplete,
uncertain, and, perhaps, false information. Some models may
provide explicit schemes for allocating intelligence, target
acquisition, and electronic warfare resources as a function
of the combat situation. Most of the technology involved in
these processes is new and has never been in large-scale
combat.
2 . Validity of Theater-Level Air Models
There are three aspects to the problem of validating
performance data in a theater-level model. The first is the
technical validity of the measurements from which the data
are obtained. Such performance data are: reliability
(abort rates)
,
probability of hit, probability of kill given
a hit, CEP, fuel consumption, etc. Validity is determined
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by statistical sampling techniques. In principle, uncertain-
ties can be reduced by increasing the sample size as long as
the environmental conditions are precisely known and can be
replicated. In practice however, that is rarely possible.
The second aspect of validity concerns the transfer
of the tactical data from the test conditions to the combat
environment that the model represents . The performance of
most systems is affected by the skill and fatigue of the
operator or pilot. The threat by the enemy fire encountered
will affect most performance factors.
The third aspect of validation is how performance
data are actually used in a model. The key point is the
time period used (6 hours, 12 or one day) . Detections,
hit, and kill probabilities are difficult to use because of
the fluctuation of the performance data over the period
used.
3 . Source of Data Collection
The best source of performance data is a recent war.
Wartime data are particularly useful for theater-level
models because many processes can be combined into a single
value, such as the expected number of kills per sortie of a
particular type of aircraft, weapon, and target. Thus,
command-control, weather, variation in pilot skill, fire




A usual source of test data is the annual training
tests, usually with a present scenario to insure that all
essential elements are covered. Data from tests should be
used with caution for two reasons: a) the goal is training,
not realistic combat, and b) many pressures exist to make
the reported data close to the performance goals stated by
the agency controlling the training.
Field tests of equipment are an excellent source of
one-on-one performance data, if allowance is subsequently
made, as in Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) , for
combat degradation factors.
Most available of all, but perhaps least useful, are
manufacturers performance estimates. One method for simu-
lating the performance of future system, thus acquiring
combat data, is to run a highly detailed model of a few-on-
few against various threats with a variety of performance
specifications to determine how sensitive some overall MOEs,
such as kills per sortie, are to variations of performance.
4 . Combat Theory
Any indepth study of theater level combat modeling
ends up in a key problem. There is a lack of coupling
between existing models of combat (abstract world of
modeling) and reality (real world) . How does this one close
the gap or forge the "missing link"? The answer is, a
Theory of Combat of War. In other words the establishment
of a link with "how does one want the model to behave."
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(3) Air Formations and Air Refueling.
(4) ECM/ECCM
(5) Survivability indices for the various aircraft types
Using ICARUS as a starting point, one cound develop an
even simpler model with one airbase on each side, or more
complicated ones with more dynamic changes and stochastic
features as well.
So ICARUS has the potential for being the basis for
development of a family of air combat models to teach the
principles of tactical air warfare.






The provided flow chart follows a stepwise process to
demonstrate a possible approach to model and simulate the
performance of a Combat Squadron, in the following sequence
of events:
a. Mission and Squadron Interaction Prior to Take-off
b. Flight Toward the Target
c. The Attack
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